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PREFACE 
he European banking sector consolidated at a rapid pace throughout 
the 1990s. The deregulation of banking activities, the progress made 
towards the completion of an integrated European financial market, 
financial globalisation, technological and financial innovations, the 
imperative of value creation and the introduction of the euro are some of 
the principal forces that have fuelled this process. Today, it seems that 
merger and acquisition (M&A) activity has resumed, as evidenced by 
several recent domestic and cross-border deals in the financial industry. 
Faced with increased risks, uncertainty and enhanced competition, banking 
institutions have had to adopt the most economic strategic means to cut 
their costs and enhance their revenues in order to remain competitive. 
Moreover, the adoption of most measures under the Financial Services 
Action Plan (FSAP) and the European Commission’s White Paper on 
financial services policy (2005-2010) towards complete integration of 
European financial markets will act as further impetus to accelerate 
consolidation in the financial services industry in the coming years. 
Nevertheless, many studies of the M&A wave of the 1990s have 
found that on average M&As are far from having proved their economic 
effectiveness. Consequently, one can question the real motives behind these 
operations for managers and shareholders and their effects on banking 
profitability, efficiency and welfare.  
In this study, we define the underlying strategies behind banking 
M&As and investigate whether they actually matter in terms of these 
effects.  
To this end, we introduce in this book a new approach based on a 
conceptual matrix built on the interaction between two criteria that can be 
used to define the various strategies underlying an M&A: the initial 
activities of the banks involved and the geographical dimension of the 
transactions. Using this matrix to sub-categorise 71 cases of banking M&As 
in Europe, we then assess the profitability and the efficiency (cost and 
profit) for the acquirers and the targets before and after the operation. The 
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analysis is based on financial ratios and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
to assess both financial and economic performance. The results obtained 
from both methodologies are then compared.  
Our results show that the economic and financial performance of 
banking M&As depends on their underlying strategies, which are defined 
by crossing the banks’ initial activities and their geographical reach. The 
optimal combination of these two factors – defining the optimal underlying 
strategy – could be a critical factor for the success or failure of an M&A.  
Rym Ayadi 
Brussels 
September 2007 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
he European banking sector experienced a rapid process of mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) during the 1990s.1 Figure 1 charts the 
growth of this phenomenon from 1990-2005. The deregulation of 
banking activities, the progress made towards the completion of an 
integrated European financial market, financial globalisation, technological 
and financial innovations, the imperative of value creation and the 
introduction of the euro are some of the principal forces that have fuelled 
the process of banking consolidation in Europe.  
Since 2003, the increase in value of domestic and cross-border 
transactions in the financial services industry suggests a resumption of 
M&A activity.2 Indeed, faced with increased risks, uncertainty and 
enhanced competition, banking, insurance and other financial institutions 
have had to adopt the most economic strategic means to cut costs and 
enhance revenues (see Figure 2 for sectoral responses). Moreover, the 
adoption of most measures under the Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP), the European Commission’s White Paper on financial services 
policy (2005-2010) towards complete integration of European financial 
markets and the tightening of the procedures that supervisory authorities 
in the member states are obliged to follow when assessing proposed M&As 
in the banking, insurance and securities sectors,3 will act decisively to 
accelerate the consolidation of financial services in the coming years.  
                                                      
1 Ayadi & Pujals (2004 and 2005). 
2 Approximately €79 billion of deals in financial services involving a target based in 
Europe were announced in 2005. Compared with 2004, this is an increase of 76% by 
transaction value (see PwC, 2006 a, b).  
3 The issue of low cross-border consolidation in the financial sector was discussed 
at the informal meeting of Economic and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) in 
September 2004.  The ministers asked the European Commission to study possible 
obstacles to cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the financial sector, arising 
both from differing supervisory practices and other, broader factors. Current EU 
rules allow supervisory authorities to block a proposed M&A if they consider that 
the 'sound and prudent management' of the target company could be put at risk. 
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Figure 1. Number and value of M&As in banking in the EU15, 1990-2005 
  
 
Notes: 2005 figures are annualised. Cross-border M&As refer to transactions in 
the EU15 involving a non-domestic acquirer. Outward M&As refer to 
non-EU acquisitions of EU15 banks (only up to 2005Q1). The number of 
deals is shown on the left-hand scale. The value of deals is represented as 
stacked lines on the right-hand scale, but is missing for a number of 
deals.  
Source: Thomson Financial SDC (2006). 
                                                                                                                                       
The resulting proposed Banking Directive provides supervisory authorities with a 
clear and transparent process for decision-making and notification. In particular, 
there is now a closed list of criteria against which the acquiring company should be 
assessed, such as the reputation of the company itself, the reputation and 
experience of any person that may run the resulting institution or firm, financial 
soundness, the extent of compliance with relevant EU directives and the risk of 
money laundering and terrorism financing. Also, the Directive reduces the 
assessment period from three months to 30 days and allows the supervisory 
authority to ‘stop the clock’ only once, under clear conditions. It amends the 
following existing directives: the Banking Directive (2006/48/EC), the Third Non-
life Insurance Directive (92/49/EEC), the Recast Life Assurance Directive 
(2002/83/EC), the Reinsurance Directive (2005/68/EC) and Directive 2006/48/EC 
on markets in financial instruments. The proposal was voted in first reading by the 
Parliament on 13 March, 2007 and will be implemented by the 27 member states as 
soon as it is published in the Official Journal.  
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Figure 2. M&A transactions in European financial sectors, 2003-05 
 
 
Note: Figure extracted from PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006), “Financial Services 
M&As 2006”; cross-border deals represented two-thirds of (depicted) total 
deals for 2005.   
Sources: Mergermarket and PwC analysis. 
M&As are among the principal responses aimed at achieving external 
growth, together with the formation of alliances and partnerships. 
Nonetheless, many studies of the M&A wave of the 1990s have found that 
M&As are far from having proved their economic effectiveness (see Figure 
3). 
To explain the underlying economic reasons behind M&As, the 
empirical literature mainly focused on examining their effects on short- 
versus long-term performance and then on discerning their effects on the 
competition in the sector in question. Undoubtedly, economies of scale and 
scope offer the main explanation behind the performance change following 
an M&A, leading to a number of empirical studies that aimed at examining 
the relationship between size and costs. However, these findings were far 
from conclusive owing to the conceptual and technical limitations 
encountered when testing for the relevant hypotheses. Nonetheless, scale 
and scope economies are the foundation for new concepts put forward 
nowadays to explain concentration in the financial sector in general and in 
the banking industry in particular. Indeed, if there is little evidence of scale 
and scope economies in the banking sector, it is important to question the 
real explanation for any changes in performance.  4 | RYM AYADI 
 
Figure 3. Performance of banking M&As 
 
 
In this context, the concept of ‘X-efficiency’, introduced by Harvey 
Leibenstein in 1966, deserves particular attention. For a variety of reasons, 
according to Leibenstein, people and organisations normally do not work 
as hard or as effectively as they could. In technical terms, X-efficiency refers 
to the deviations from the production-efficient frontier that depicts the 
maximum attainable output for a given level of input. This concept seems 
to offer a greater predictive power today on performance changes in banks 
in general and in banking M&As in particular.  
In addition to scale, scope economies and X-efficiency, M&As could 
be justified by revenue diversification, risk reduction and market power. 
The latter is particularly relevant in highly concentrated banking markets 
and when a merger or an acquisition is targeting the same activity or 
region.  
To test these theoretical justifications, several academic studies have 
examined the performance change of banking M&As, using either static or 
dynamic analyses. The former investigates the relationship between size 
and efficiency and the latter assesses the changes before and after an 
M&A.4 Other studies have also tried to examine the impact of an M&A on 
market power. 
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After reviewing the findings of the main empirical academic research 
in the US and Europe related to the dynamic analysis of banking M&A 
performance, we introduce a new approach to categorise and assess 
banking M&As. This approach is based on a conceptual matrix5, which is 
built on the interaction between two criteria that we consider as defining 
dimensions of the various strategies underlying the M&As: the activity of 
the banks involved in the M&A and the geographical dimension of the 
transaction. Then, based on the resulting categorisation of 71 banking 
M&As in Europe, we assess the profitability and the efficiency (cost and 
profit) for the acquirers and the targets before and after the operation and 
we compare both findings. The analysis is based on financial ratios and 
data envelopment analysis (DEA), which is a non-parametric approach, to 
assess both profitability and cost and profit efficiency.  
                                                      
5 This approach is briefly introduced in Ayadi & Pujals (2004) and elaborated in 
Ayadi (2006).   
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2.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
ccording to the academic literature in banking and industrial 
economics, a variety of motivations drive consolidation, ranging 
from value maximisation (including cost reduction and revenue 
growth) to other external and managerial goals.  
2.1  Maximising-value explanations of M&As 
The economic literature has justified banking M&As on the ground that it 
enhances shareholder value. Indeed, the strengthening of the shareholders’ 
role, the increasing importance of institutional investors in banking capital 
(pension funds, mutual funds, private equity and recently hedge funds), 
the pressure from financial markets and new corporate governance rules 
have encouraged managers to orient their business objectives towards 
value-maximisation. 
The traditional argument that M&As increase shareholder value is 
based on the assumption that the anticipated value of the entity created by 
the merger of two groups will exceed, in terms of potential wealth creation, 
the sum of the respective values of the two separate groups. That is: 1+1 = 
3. Two main types of synergies are achieved: operating synergies and 
financial synergies. The former takes the form of either revenue 
enhancement or cost reduction. The latter refers to the possibility that the 
cost of capital may be lowered by combining one or more companies. 
In theory, M&A operations in the banking sector could create value 
by obtaining gains either in terms of efficiency or market power. Other 
motivations of M&As are also briefly discussed since they may partly offer 
a plausible explanation for certain types of transactions. 
2.2  M&As and efficiency  
An M&A allows the resulting company to obtain efficiency gains through 
cost reductions (or cost synergies), revenue increases (or revenue 
synergies), the exchange of best practices and/ or risk diversification. (see 
Table 1). 
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Table 1. Synergies announced in recent M&A deals in the EU 
Banks Year  Expected 
synergies  
(€ million) 
Revenue 
synergies  
(%) 
Cost 
synergies 
(%) 
UniCredit-HVB   2005  985*  9  91 
SCH-Abbey National  2004  560  20  80 
Crédit Agricole-Crédit 
Lyonnais 
2002 760  0  100 
Caisses d’Epargne-CDC 
IXIS 
2001 500  85  15 
Allianz-Dresdner 2001  1,080  88 12 
Halifax-Bank of Scotland  2001  1,113  51  49 
Dexia-Artesia 2001  200  15  85 
HVB-Bank Austria  2000  500  0  100 
RBoS-Natwest 2000  2,335  17  83 
BNP-Paribas 1999  850  18  82 
BBV-Argentaria 1999  511  0  100 
Intesa-COMIT 1999  1,000  50  50 
Banco Santander-BCH  1999  630  0  100 
* To be achieved in 2008.  
Sources: Annual reports and financial press. 
Cost synergies result from an improved organisation of banking 
production, a better scale and/or a better combination of production 
factors. The core objective is to extract benefits from cost complementarities 
and economies of scale and scope. In practice, cost synergies might be 
derived from a) the integration of different skilled teams or information 
technology infrastructures, b) the combination of different back-office and 
general services or c) the rationalisation of the domestic and/or 
international banking networks.  
Revenue synergies also derive from a better combination of 
production factors. Improvements in the organisation of activities, 
however, offer benefits from product complementarities that help to 
enhance revenues. In practice, revenue synergies might result from the 
harmonisation of product ranges, the existing complementarities between 
activities, cross-selling and the generalisation of a ‘multi-distribution 
channel’ approach to the various segments of customers.  
It should be noted, however, that revenue synergies are much more 
difficult to obtain compared to cost synergies, because they depend not 8 | RYM AYADI 
 
only on managers’ decisions but also on customer behaviour. In this 
respect, several studies have estimated that some 5% to 10% of a bank’s 
customers leave the bank after a merger.6 Accordingly, M&As between 
banking institutions in Europe very often have higher targeted cost 
synergies than revenue synergies.  
To achieve the goal of efficiency, two types of strategies can be 
pointed out. Firstly, in theory, a merger or an acquisition involving two 
companies with homogeneous activity profiles should lead to economies of 
scale by reducing the unitary production costs, as a result of an increase in 
activity volume and a decrease in the fixed costs obtained by combining the 
support functions (marketing, information technology, physical 
infrastructures, personnel management, etc.). The final objective is to obtain 
a competitive advantage in the activities involved.  
In Europe, expectations ride high in the reinforcement of retail 
banking. The strategy consists firstly in merging banking institutions, while 
maintaining the existing branch network and secondly in implementing 
upstream cost synergies, i.e. at the level of physical network management. 
The desire to achieve greater economies of scale can be seen in the recent 
operations of several retail banks: BHV in Germany, SCH and BBVA in 
Spain, CIC-Crédit Mutuel in France, Unicredit in Italy and Lloyds TSB or 
RBoS-Natwest in the United Kingdom. 
The second strategy to achieve greater efficiency is adopted in 
circumstances where banking institutions are operating in heterogeneous 
but complementary markets. A merger or an acquisition not only allows 
the resulting company to widen its customers’ portfolio but it also leads to 
a more diversified range of services and offers scope economies by 
optimising the synergies between the merged activities. Here, the main 
objective is to increase revenues, rather than to obtain economies of scale. 
For this, two possibilities could be highlighted according to the 
complementarities attained through diversifying activities or geographical 
areas. In the first case, scope economies are generally obtained through a 
merger or an acquisition either between commercial banks and investment 
banks, or between banks and insurance companies, as illustrated by a few 
recent transactions in Europe: Allianz-Dresdner in Germany, BNP-Paribas 
and Caisses d’Epargne-CDC IXIS in France or San Paolo-IMI in Italy. 
Similarly, the acquisition of Bankers Trust by Deutsche Bank was 
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completed mainly to penetrate the American market for investment 
banking.7 In the second case, the principle of geographical 
complementarities has increased the interest on the part of Crédit Agricole 
to acquire Crédit Lyonnais in France. The first is firmly anchored in the 
provinces and in rural areas, whereas the second has a strong presence in 
the Ile-de-France (urban area of Paris) and other large French cities.  
In sum, efficiency gains are obtained by input and output 
adjustments in order to reduce costs, increase revenues and/or reduce risks 
so as to increase the value added.  The restructuring of operations can also 
allow efficiency gains through the reorganisation of teams (managers and 
employees) and/or the generalisation of ‘best practices’. This is known as 
‘X-efficiency’ (described in the Introduction), which is the managerial 
ability to decide on input and output in order to minimise costs (or 
maximise revenues).  
Lately, beyond greater economies of scale and scope, efficiency can 
also be improved by a greater diversification of risks (functional and/or 
geographical8).  
Efficiency may be improved following a merger or an acquisition, if 
the acquiring institution is more efficient ex ante and brings the efficiency of 
the target up to its own level by spreading its superior managerial 
expertise, policies and procedures.9 Simulation evidence suggests that large 
efficiency gains are possible if the best practices of the acquirers reform the 
practices of inefficient targets.10  
                                                      
7 One might also mention in this context UBS and PaineWebber or Crédit Suisse 
Group and DLJ in 2000, and Dresdner Bank and Wasserstein Perella in 2001.  
8 According to Méon & Weill (2001), a comparison of the annual growth rate of real 
GDP suggests that the economic cycles of many European countries are not 
perfectly correlated. Consequently, geographical diversification could enable 
European banks to significantly reduce their risks. 
9 Generally, the acquiring bank in a merger is more cost-efficient and profitable 
than the institution being acquired. As noted in a recent survey (Berger et al., 1999), 
this holds for the US (Berger & Humphrey, 1992; Pilloff & Santomero, 1997; 
Peristiani, 1997; Cummins et al., 1999 and Fried et al., 1999) as well as for Europe 
(Vander Vennet, 1996 and Focarelli et al., 2002). The expectation is that the more 
efficient and profitable acquiring bank will restructure the target institution and 
implement policies and procedures to improve its performance.  
10 Shaffer (1993). 10 | RYM AYADI 
 
The M&A event itself may also improve efficiency by alerting 
management to the need for improvement or to implement substantial 
restructuring. Alternatively, efficiency may worsen because of the costs of 
consummating the M&A (legal & consultancy fees, severance pay, etc.) or 
disruptions from downsizing or difficulties in integrating corporate 
cultures. Efficiency may also decline because of organisational 
diseconomies in operating or monitoring a more complex institution. 
In practice, efficiency gains do not appear to be the only explanation 
for the recent M&A wave in banking. Gains obtained through increased 
market power seem to also offer a strong incentive to merge, but the 
relationship between market concentration and performance has only been 
partially verified.11 Seeking other explanations for the current 
phenomenon, studies carried out in the United States and in Europe tend to 
confirm that ‘managerial hubris’, empire-building, mimicry effect and 
defensive reaction are factors that are likely to play an important role. 
2.3  M&As and market power 
Theoretically, market power is defined as the capacity to fix market prices 
as a result of a dominant position in a certain market. The economic 
literature12 concludes that prices are positively correlated to local market 
shares in general, but this position is not justified in the context of 
international markets (inter-banking activities, multinational companies...). 
Therefore, increased market power can be gained through a merger or an 
acquisition of two competing institutions operating in the same local 
market.  
Thus, value creation through market power would seem the more 
likely explanation for mergers at the local level and within the same 
activity (especially in retail banking), which appears to be coherent with the 
theoretical evidence noted above, in particular in the European Union, 
where the majority of the operations are within sectors and are national.13 
In practice, banking institutions can influence supply (as a supplier) 
or demand prices (as a client). In the first case, the size obtained following a 
merger or an acquisition might create a dominant position which enables 
                                                      
11 Rhoades (1998). 
12 Hannan (1991) and Berger & Hannan (1989, 1997). 
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the bank to manipulate price levels in a certain market either by a) 
decreasing prices (by pre-emption and/or predation14) to evict some non-
competitive existing banking institutions and/or new entrants, or b) 
increasing prices in the absence of effective competition in the 
marketplace.15 In the second case, the size obtained will enable the new 
group to reduce its refinancing costs owing to reputation, size or 
diversification effects.  
Nevertheless, several studies16 have shown that the previous 
correlation between concentration levels and market power diminished 
during the 1990s. This change could be attributed to the opening up of 
markets which has encouraged the entry of new competitors and thus 
increased the degree of contestability in the market.17 Moreover, the 
emergence of new distribution channels such as e-banking, while 
contributing to the disappearance of the geographical boundaries, has 
made the concept of ‘local market’ less relevant.  
Based on the hypothesis of the increase of market power, it appears 
that the creation of mega-banks, by altering effective competition, does not 
allow for any immediate profit for consumers because of dominant position 
abuses18 and consumers’ surplus capture.  
                                                      
14 Pre-emption implies that the price fixed by the bank is lower than the average cost 
while predation involves fixing the price at a level lower than the marginal cost.  
15 Market power can be gauged by looking at the transmission of market interest 
rates to bank retail rates.  
16 Hannan (1997) and Radecki (1998). 
17 A contestable market displays low barriers to entry and exit (Baumol et al., 1982). 
In such a situation, potential competitors may engage in hit-and-run behaviour to 
take advantage of the super normal profit situation of the market. Contestability 
hinges on the absence of exit costs (called ‘sunk costs’), which are the costs that 
cannot be recovered by transferring assets to another use or by selling them. Entry 
to the financial services sector requires substantial investment that tends to be sunk 
to a high degree.  
18 The possibility of a cartel forming in banking is not purely theoretical and can be 
prejudicial for effective competition, as shown by the ‘Cruickshank report’ (2000) 
in the UK and in Canoy & Onderstal (2003) in the Netherlands. 12 | RYM AYADI 
 
2.4  Other non-maximising value explanations of M&As 
When control and ownership are separated within the firm,19 managers can 
pursue other objectives than maximising shareholder value or increasing 
profit. Instead of enhancing shareholders’ wealth, a manager might prefer 
to serve his/her own interests. Therefore, it is possible that a merger or an 
acquisition is simply a result of a heuristic way of addressing optimism20 
and/or mainly dictated by the power, prestige and/or higher 
compensation that are related to the management of a larger firm, which is 
in line with the empire-building hypothesis.21 In that case, it is the desire 
for power22 that is expressed, and not the direct interest of the shareholders. 
This situation is more likely to arise where shareholding is dispersed and 
passive.  
M&A operations can also be triggered by a mimicry effect following 
the consolidation process initiated by competitors in the marketplace.23 
Indeed, within a relatively concentrated sector, the actions of the major 
‘player(s)’ might have an immediate impact on the behaviour of others, 
inducing in turn a homogeneous behaviour. As John Maynard Keynes once 
said, “worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for the reputation to fail 
conventionally than to succeed unconventionally”.  
During the last two decades, indeed, the development strategies in 
the banking industry were very often induced by common strategic 
standards, which have led to a rather homogeneous behaviour. As shown 
in the 1980s, the commercial strategies of banking institutions were marked 
by a race to achieve a larger size. Similarly, in the 1990s, enhancing the 
profitability of shareholders’ equity became the new development 
standard. Today, targeted value creation represents the major strategic 
issue in modern banking management circles.  
Moreover, the acceleration of M&A operations could also result from 
a defensive reaction on the part of a few actors against competitors’ 
                                                      
19 Referred to as ‘agency relation’ by Jensen & Meckling (1976). 
20 “Bidding firms infected by hubris simply pay too much for their target” (Roll, 1986, p. 
1). “If there actually are no aggregate gains in takeover, the phenomenon depends on the 
overbearing presumption of bidders that their valuations are correct” (Ibid., p. 5). 
21 Jensen (1986). 
22 According to ‘managerial theory’ (see Berle & Means, 1932; Williamson, 1964). 
23 Also called a ‘follow the leader’ strategy. ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF BANKING M&AS IN EUROPE | 13 
 
initiatives. Indeed, as the wave of mergers spreads, banking institutions 
that have remained outside the process are likely to become themselves a 
potential target in a hostile takeover transaction. To protect themselves 
from possible predators, managers can pursue an active acquisition policy 
in order to maintain their position.  
N u m e r o u s  M & A s  c a r r i e d  o u t  r e c e n t l y  i n  f a c t  s e e m  t o  h a v e  b e e n  
dictated by the desire to modify the existing equilibrium and to be 
proactive to others’ actions. Sometimes disguised as a hypothetical value 
creation move, a number of these operations are primarily the reflection of 
the single market impetus, where mergers have simply become the 
objective rather than the result of careful strategic thinking. Most European 
banking institutions, reacting to the increased contestability of their 
national banking market, have sought to strengthen their national position, 
in order to improve their profitability and to protect their position from 
new competitive entrants.  
Finally, the new mechanisms of corporate governance, including 
takeover threats, large and activist shareholders and effective boards, may 
offer a plausible explanation for the recent banking consolidation process. 
Committed to ensuring the growth of their companies to satisfy internal 
pressure while maintaining their competitiveness to withstand fierce 
external competition and forced to provide equity capital to which pressing 
remuneration requirements are attached, bank managers have pursued 
external growth through M&As as a strategic means to expand their 
activities.   
| 14 
 
3.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
everal studies have tried to assess the performance of M&As in 
banking in the 1990s. The majority have concentrated on the impact 
on shareholder value and efficiency on the one hand, and on the 
consequences for customers – households and SMEs (small- and medium-
sized enterprises) – via the increase of market power on the other hand.  
Concerning the impact of M&As on shareholder value and efficiency, 
the results were mixed. Several academic studies have been carried out 
mainly in the United States, using a wide range of methodologies, from the 
most basic (event studies or balance-sheet-based indicators) to the most 
sophisticated (efficiency frontiers), but their findings have not been 
conclusive. 
The studies on the impact of mergers on consumer welfare focused 
primarily on the possible market power effect without considering that 
under certain conditions, M&As might improve the consumers’ surplus.  
3.1  Banking M&As and value creation: Results are still inconclusive 
A large number of event studies have been carried out to assess the effects 
of M&As on stock market values. They all tend to evaluate the change in 
total market value of the acquiring company plus target institutions – 
adjusted for changes in overall stock market values – associated with an 
M&A announcement. This change embodies the present value of expected 
future changes in terms of efficiency and market power. Although these 
effects cannot be disentangled, the change in market value may be viewed 
as an understatement of the expected efficiency improvement, since it is 
unlikely that an M&A would reduce the market power of the participants.24 
                                                      
24 Berger (2003). 
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In the US, the empirical results were mixed.25 On average, the 
combined shareholder value (i.e. the bidder and the target) is not affected 
by the announcement of the deal since the bidder suffers a loss that offsets 
the gains of the target.26 Therefore, an M&A only implies a transfer of 
wealth from the shareholders of the bidder to those of the target. 
Compared to the 1980s, however, the evidence from the 1990s was more 
favourable where average abnormal returns have been higher for both 
bidders and targets.27  
Other studies examined the stock market’s reaction to different types 
of deals. Houston & Ryngaert (1994) found that the combined gains tend to 
be greater when the bidding firm is unusually profitable or when there is 
significant overlap between institutions. The first result is consistent with a 
market for corporate control favouring competent over incompetent 
managers. The second result is consistent with the market power 
hypothesis, according to which a higher market share leads to higher 
profits. DeLong (2001) found that mergers that concentrate banks 
geographically or in product create value, while those that diversify them 
don’t create value.  
                                                      
25 Rhoades (1994) and Pilloff & Santomero (1997) provide a survey of event studies. 
Some studies of US banking M&As found increases in the combined value around 
the time of an M&A’s announcement (Cornett & Tehranian, 1992 and Zhang, 1995); 
others found no improvement in combined value (Hannan & Wolken, 1989; 
Houston & Ryngaert, 1994; Pilloff, 1996 and Kwan & Eisenbeis, 1999); while still 
others found that the measured effects depended upon the characteristics of the 
M&A (Houston & Ryngaert, 1997). A study of domestic and cross-border M&As 
involving US banks found more value created by cross-border M&As (DeLong, 
1999).  
26 Stock market event studies of bank mergers have shown that merger 
announcements typically result in a fall in the equity value of the acquiring firm 
and no significant gain in the combined value of the two firms together. This result 
suggests that the market believes that, on average, there are unlikely to be 
substantial gains realised from bank mergers. And since the value of the acquiring 
firm typically falls, the market also believes that acquiring firms tend to overpay 
for acquisitions in anticipation of merger benefits that are not likely to be realised. 
This is a common finding and is not limited to bank mergers, which points in the 
direction of a more general problem associated with the corporate governance of 
M&As. 
27 Becher (2000) and Houston et al. (2001). 16 | RYM AYADI 
 
On the other hand, Zhang (1995) found results consistent with the 
diversification hypothesis, according to which geographical diversification 
leads to a lower variability of income; and that out-of-market transactions 
create value for shareholders. Higher market concentration is likely to lead 
to an increase in prices for retail financial services, leading in turn to an 
increase in profits. It is also true, however, that firms operating in more 
concentrated markets are generally found to be less efficient.28 This effect 
might offset the gains from an increase in market power and thus leave 
unchanged the market value of the bank.  
In Europe, the few studies carried out to assess the value creation 
through M&As in banking found positive abnormal combined returns. In 
the study conducted by Van Beek & Rad (1997), these returns were not 
statistically significant. In contrast, Cybo-Ottone & Murgia (2000) found 
that shareholder value gains were positive and significant, mostly driven 
by domestic bank-to-bank deals and diversification of banks into insurance. 
In 2001, Beitel & Schiereck found an increase of the combined value of 
bidders and targets for domestic M&As but a decrease in the case of cross-
border M&As. These findings were confirmed in Beitel et al. (2004) on a 
sample of 98 M&As in 1985-2000, showing that transactions that 
concentrate the same activities as well as those whose targets are less 
performing increase value.  
These positive abnormal returns, however, do not necessarily mean 
that mergers improve efficiency; in fact, one possible explanation for the 
difference between the European and American markets is that weaker 
antitrust enforcement in some European countries allows gains in 
monopoly power from in-market mergers.  
Finally, according to the business consulting literature, it seems that 
the large majority of M&As carried out recently, in Europe or in the US, are 
far from having proved their effectiveness in terms of value creation in the 
short run.29 
                                                      
28 Berger & Hannan (1998). 
29 According to AT Kearney (1999): “58% of the M&As announced and completed 
are unfortunately a failure. Indeed, the stock market value of the merged entity 
two years after the operation is lower than the sum of both separated partners 
three months before.” Similarly, according to a KPMG survey (2001): “30% of the 
M&As have increased the shareholders’ value, 39% haven’t brought any 
considerable change and almost 31% have destroyed value”. In other words, 70% 
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The empirical research based on event studies should however be 
taken with caution since the methodology suffers from several limitations. 
One problem is that the announcement of a deal mixes information 
concerning the proposed merger with information on its financing. Because 
investors consider the announcement of a stock issuance as ‘bad news’, the 
negative returns to the bidding bank could reflect the fact that mergers tend 
to be financed with stocks. Consistent with this notion, one study finds that 
returns to bidders are significantly higher when mergers are financed with 
cash in comparison with mergers financed with new equity.30 Also, event 
studies rely heavily on investors’ perceptions and their expectations of the 
future gains when there are rumours around the transactions. This may 
result from pure speculative behaviour.  
3.2  Banking M&As and efficiency 
The studies carried out on a sample of US banks showed, on average, very 
little or no improvement in cost efficiency f r o m  M & A s  i n  t h e  1 9 8 0 s . 31 
However, the results of studies using data from the 1990s were mixed.32 On 
the one hand, some found that mergers produce no improvement in banks’ 
cost efficiency,33 especially when the deals involve very large banks.34 It 
was also shown that on average, smaller banking institutions tend to 
exhibit larger variations in X-inefficiencies than larger institutions.35 This 
                                                                                                                                       
of mergers were unsuccessful in producing any business benefit as regards 
shareholder value. Finally, according to Merrill Lynch (2003), not only do most 
mergers fail to deliver their promised value, but large deals have tended to 
perform worse than smaller ones. And at least 50% of major mergers since 1990 
have eroded shareholder returns (see Figure 3). 
30 Houston & Ryngaert (1997). 
31 Berger & Humphrey (1992), Srinivasan (1992) and Pilloff (1996). 
32 One limitation applies to this literature: the efficiency gains or losses associated 
with M&A activity may take a very long period of time to materialise, but these 
studies only focus on a short period before and after each M&A (see Berger, 2003).  
33 Peristiani (1997), Berger (1998) and Rhoades (1998). 
34 Akhavein et al. (1997) and Berger (2000). 
35 X- inefficiencies have been broadly investigated in the US but without giving a 
final answer. Indeed, the first cause is linked to the size; on average, operating 
costs of larger banks are found to be closer to the optimal frontier curve than those 
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may be due to the organisational diseconomies of operating larger firms in 
relation to disruptions from the M&A process, which may offset most 
potential efficiency gains. And on the other hand, other studies found cost 
reductions also obtained for very large US banks.36 
The evidence for European banks is broadly consistent with the US 
results. Domestic mergers among banks of equal size seem to improve cost 
efficiency, but these results do not hold for all countries and all banks.37 
Nationally, studies on Italian banks38 or UK building societies39 found 
significant cost-efficiency gains following an M&A. Moreover, simulation 
evidence suggests that a cross-border acquisition may be associated with a 
reduction in the costs of the target, while little effect is found for domestic 
M&As.40 Conversely, Vander Vennet (2002b) found no tangible gains in 
terms of cost efficiency in the case of cross-border M&As. The difficulties in 
improving cost efficiency may be related to the obstacles often 
encountered, especially in continental Europe, in reducing a bank’s labour 
force. In fact, personnel reduction, one of the main sources of savings, is 
hardly an option in countries with rigid labour markets.41 
Studies on profit efficiency of US banks more often found gains from 
M&As. The fact that cost efficiency is, on average, little improved as a 
result of a bank merger does not necessarily mean that there is no 
                                                                                                                                       
of smaller banks to their respective cost frontier (Kwan & Eisenbeis, 1999). This 
could be explained by the fact that larger banks operating in metropolitan markets 
are more likely to face stronger competition than smaller banks, which are more 
likely to operate in suburban or rural areas. The second reason is linked to risk 
taking; inefficient institutions are found to take in a higher level of risk (Gorten & 
Rosen, 1995). It is indeed very likely that managers of inefficient banks are more 
inclined to compensate the operating inefficiency by taking on more risk which 
may reward them with a higher yield. Finally, the third reason is the financial 
condition which is linked to the percentage of problem loans and other illiquid 
positions in the balance and off balance sheets. The correlation between poor asset 
quality and inefficiency may be an indication of poor management. 
36 Houston et al. (2001). 
37 Vander Vennet (1996). 
38 Resti (1998). 
39 Haynes & Thompson (1999). 
40 Altunbas et al. (1997). 
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improvement in profits. Profit efficiency incorporates both costs as well as 
revenue efficiency. Revenue efficiency can be improved by simply raising 
prices as market power42 expands through the merger process itself. Or 
revenues may rise because the merged institution restructures its assets 
mix.  
Two studies in particular have attempted to determine the profit 
effects of mergers. Akhavein et al. (1997) found little change in cost 
efficiency but an improvement in profit efficiency of large US banks from 
1980-90 following M&As, especially when both merger participants were 
relatively inefficient prior to the merger.43 Also, after merging, banks 
tended to shift their portfolios to take on more loans and fewer securities. 
They attribute gains in profit efficiency to the benefits of risk 
diversification: larger banks have more diversified loan portfolios and 
lower equity-asset ratios. But their measure of profit efficiency does not 
account for changes in risk likely to result from such a portfolio switch. 
Berger (1998) found similar results in a study that included all US bank 
mergers, both large and small, from 1990 to 1995.  
In Europe, Vander Vennet (1996) found that domestic mergers of 
equals in European countries have a positive impact on profitability, 
mainly driven by improvements in operational efficiency. As regards cross-
border M&As, he only found a partial profit efficiency improvement that 
may be caused by changes in the pricing behaviour of the acquired banks.44 
Focarelli et al. (2002) found that Italian deals that consist of the purchase of 
a majority (but not all) of the voting shares of the target appear to result in 
                                                      
42 Many studies of market structure, price conduct and profit performance found 
that higher bank concentration is significantly associated with lower prices for 
deposits, but the relationship between higher concentration and higher profits is 
often mixed, being sometimes significant and sometimes not. Berger and Hannan, 
(1998) found that cost efficiency tends to be lower in markets where concentration 
is higher. Indeed, higher concentration (market power) may lead to higher prices 
and revenues but, with less competition, the incentive to reduce costs to their 
minimum levels is blunted. So, the higher revenues are largely absorbed in higher 
costs rather than contributing fully to expanded profits. From this perspective, 
market concentration seems to have a greater negative effect on cost efficiency than 
it does on prices.  
43 Other relevant studies include Berger (1993), Berger & Mester (1997), Clark & 
Siems (1997), Cummins et al. (1999) and Berger (2000). 
44 Vander Vennet (2002b). 20 | RYM AYADI 
 
significant improvements, mainly due to a decrease in bad loans. For full 
mergers, they observe that Italian banks aim to change their business focus 
towards providing a broader range of financial services and thus increase 
their non-interest income, rather than to obtain efficiency gains. After the 
merger, they observe an increase in profitability in the long run that is also 
related to a more efficient use of capital.  
3.3   Banking M&As and market power 
The effects of an M&A on the collective welfare – mainly via prices – 
depend on numerous factors. 
Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish between national and cross-
border M&A operations. Prior studies of the pricing effects of M&As45 
found that national consolidation, by strengthening the degree of 
concentration, could generate substantial market power, which is likely to 
be harmful for households and SMEs.  
However, the few existing studies on European bank mergers seem to 
conclude that there are often significant efficiency gains which result in 
better conditions for consumers. Huizinga et al. (2001) analysed 52 major 
mergers between European banks between 1994 and 1998, which were 
found to be largely ‘socially’ beneficial. Some other studies found strong 
evidence of positive effects of M&As at a country level, leading to more 
favourable prices for consumers.46  
Conversely, cross-border M&A operations would intensify 
competition in the domestic market but do not change the banks’ local 
market shares. Consequently, the national authorities, after having 
encouraged the formation of ‘national champions’, should promote cross-
                                                      
45 Berger et al. (1998 and 1999). 
46 A number of further studies exist at the country level. For example, by 
distinguishing between short-run and long-run effects of M&As, Focarelli & 
Panetta (2002) have found strong evidence that these effects are different. Precisely, 
they showed that national mergers leading to deposit rate changes are 
unfavourable to consumers in the short-run, but in the long run, if banks succeed 
in reducing costs, efficiency gains from mergers prevail over the market power 
effects, so that consumers benefit. Hence, the adverse price changes generated 
through consolidation are by all means temporary. Thus, studies restricted to a 
short post-merger period might fail to register the efficiency gains and as a 
consequence overestimate the adverse price changes. ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF BANKING M&AS IN EUROPE | 21 
 
border and particularly pan-European operations. However, this 
hypothesis is relatively relaxed in view of the cross-border consolidation 
wave in Eastern European countries. Competitive concerns in these 
markets may arise if cross-border players reach the concentration threshold 
perceived to be harmful to consumers.  
Secondly, it is also essential to distinguish M&A operations according 
to the ‘means’ used – market power or efficiency gains – to create 
shareholder value. If the value creation occurs primarily through increased 
market power, the transaction would only constitute simple profit 
redistribution in favour of shareholders, but to the detriment of the 
customers, employees and public authorities, without a net gain in terms of 
collective welfare. In this case, the transaction involves a simple 
redistribution between the various stakeholders of the banking institution, 
which does not create wealth for the economy because the increase of 
banking profits is much lower than the welfare loss suffered by the other 
economic agents.  
On the other hand, value creation obtained through the improvement 
of efficiency (through scale and/or scope economies, risk diversification...), 
will benefit not only the shareholders, but also the customers (price drop 
and/or improvement in the quality of the services) and the public 
authorities (higher solvency). For the employees, the results remain 
unclear. The overall impact of the consolidation process remains 
ambiguous, according to whether market power or efficiency effects would 
prevail.  
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4.  A  NEW CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO 
ASSESSING M&AS IN BANKING 
he empirical evidence suggests that M&As in banking do not 
significantly improve cost and profit efficiency and, on average, do 
not generate significant shareholder value. These results seem to 
contradict the motivations cited by practitioners for consolidation 
strategies, which are largely related to economies of scale and scope and to 
improvements in management quality. However, there are a few possible 
explanations for the divergence between the empirical evidence and 
bankers’ beliefs.47 
In general:  
1.  The lack of clear-cut results on the effects of M&A could reflect 
difficulties in measuring efficiency improvements. 
2.  Studies restricted to short post-merger periods might fail to detect 
value gains that can only emerge slowly, after some years. For 
example, studies restricted to a short post-merger period might fail to 
account for the efficiency gains of consolidation.48 Long lags in the 
improvement of performance may reflect difficulties in refocusing 
lending policies, rationalising branches, integrating data processing 
systems and operations, and training the personnel of the target to 
market the new owner’s products.49 Moreover, culture clashes may be 
                                                      
47 Amel et al. (2002). 
48 In an analysis of the effects of M&A in the market for bank deposits, Focarelli & 
Panetta (2002) find that in the short run the costs of restructuring the consolidated 
bank cancel out the gains, which cannot fully emerge for years. In the long run, 
however, the efficiency gains dominate over the market power effect, leading to 
more favourable prices for consumers.   
49 Berger et al. (1998) and Calomiris & Karceski (1998) mention three years as the 
gestation period needed to restructure the merged bank. This is consistent with the 
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especially harmful in banking,50 as the relationship with customers 
depends heavily on soft information51, which is more difficult to 
transfer than such hard information as balance sheet data. The 
resignation of key executives or the emergence of morale problems 
due to reassignments or employee turnover may cause a loss of 
information, especially when the new management has little time to 
develop customer information. 
3.  Deals done in the past might have suffered from stricter regulation 
that prevented firms involved in an M&A from reaping all the 
benefits of the deal. For example, the limitations imposed by the 
Glass-Steagall Act on the range of US banks’ financial activities could 
have impeded the realisation of gains from cross-selling. Similarly, 
restrictions on bank branching or on geographical expansion could 
have hampered the exploitation of scale economies. This view 
suggests that the deregulation of banking in all major countries (e.g. 
the Riegle-Neal Act or the Gramm-Leach-Billey Act in the US) might 
increase the potential for scale and scope economies. The evidence 
available for the 1990s in the US is consistent with this view.  
4.  The fact that mergers often occur in waves makes it hard to separate 
the effect of a single deal from transformations experienced by the 
industry as a whole.  
5.  Another possibility is that – in the presence of agency problems 
between managers and shareholders – M&As could be mainly driven 
by non-value maximising motives (such as ‘managerial hubris’ 
and/or empire building etc). Non-value maximising motivations for 
M&As have been analysed in recent papers that examine the 
relationship between executive compensation and M&A activity. 
                                                                                                                                       
results of the interviews conducted by the Federal Reserve Board staff with 
officials of banks involved in mergers (Rhoades, 1998). In a study of US bank 
mergers, Houston et al. (2001) find that cost savings and revenue gains take two to 
four years. 
50 Practitioners indicate that ‘differences in corporate cultures’ is one of the main 
obstacles to the completion of bank mergers in all the major industrial countries 
(see BIS, 2001). 
51 This condition is relaxed with the implementation of Basel II. Banks are required 
to collect as much data as possible from their customers to compute the parameters 
set by the regulators to calculate minimum capital requirements.   24 | RYM AYADI 
 
According to these studies, the motivations of M&As could be traced 
back to managers’ desire to increase their compensation (CEOs of 
larger institutions earn higher compensation). There is some evidence 
that CEOs with higher levels of stock-based compensation relative to 
cash-based compensation are less inclined to lead their institutions to 
make acquisitions.52 Moreover, managers without a large stake in 
their banks are more likely to get involved in non-value maximising 
mergers.53 Thus, managerial hubris and empire-building may be 
important reasons for the lack of conclusive evidence on the benefits 
of M&As among banks during the past decades.54 
6.  Finally, traditional banks which historically provided deposits and 
loans simply do not exist nowadays.55 Banks became highly 
diversified institutions organised around different activities (retail 
banking, investment banking, private banking and asset 
management…) and each of these activities obeys a specific business 
model. As a consequence, academic analysis should focus on a bank 
as a multi-line business rather than considering it as a mono-line 
business. However, difficulties in the availability of data are not easy 
to solve simply because there is not yet a single definition for one or 
another banking activity at a national, regional or international level. 
This is a real impediment to the collection of a homogeneous and 
comparable set of data for banking institutions.  
Particularly in Europe:  
1.  The rigidity of labour markets makes it difficult to reduce 
overlapping costs in the process of restructuring following M&As, 
which limits the potential of variable cost savings. Moreover, the 
remaining obstacles56 to an integrated European financial market 
hamper the exploitation of potential cost and revenue synergies. The 
                                                      
52 See De Vincenzo et al. (2006), Bliss & Rosen (2001). Similar results on the 
existence of agency problems in the banking industry can be found in Gorton & 
Rosen (1995) and Ryan (1999).   
53 Palia (1993). 
54 Pilloff & Santomero (1997). 
55 Pastré (2006). 
56 I d e n t i f i e d  i n  a  s u r v e y  c o n d u c t e d  b y  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m i s s i o n  i n  2 0 0 5  ( s e e  
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latter reason could be overcome in the coming years thanks to the 
European Commission’s efforts to foster financial market integration.  
2.  The difficulties stem from the fact that the M&A phenomenon in 
financial services is still fairly new to have produced sufficient 
empirical results worthy of serious academic study. As a result, the 
majority of the studies have mainly focused on the US,57 but lessons 
cannot automatically be applied to the European environment since 
the regulation and the structure of European banking markets are 
fundamentally different.58 Moreover, over the past years, the 
European financial market has been undergoing fundamental 
regulatory changes including some 45 measures that will certainly 
impact the organisation of the European financial industry in the 
future.  
3.  Moreover, it is quite difficult to come up with general rules to assess 
M&As because each one depends on the particular context in which it 
was carried out (such as the flexibility of the labour market, the 
applicable takeover regulations including the spectrum of takeover 
mechanisms, the effectiveness of corporate governance rules, the 
liquidity of the capital market, the different sizes of the institutions 
involved, their original activities, their geographical outreach, their 
corporate structure (private, hybrid or public) and also the intrinsic 
characteristics of the operation (friendly or hostile, cash or equity 
financed, etc.). 
Building upon the theoretical background of M&As in banking and 
considering the fact that the empirical literature has assessed M&As either 
by breaking down the sample according to the geographical or activity 
dimension, we introduce a new approach based on a conceptual matrix that 
is constructed on the interaction between these two dimensions. We 
                                                      
57 DeLong & DeYoung (2004) have advanced the ‘learning by observing’ 
hypothesis which supposes that the mergers of the mid- or late 1990s would have 
been more likely to create value than the mergers of the 1980s, due to the fact that 
bank managers would have benefited from having observed a large number of 
mergers before starting one. This is typically linked to the information spillover 
hypothesis. It also suggests that the stock market would have been a more accurate 
predictor of the long-run performance of banking mergers announced during the 
1990s than those announced during the 1980s.  
58 Dietsch & Oung (2001).  26 | RYM AYADI 
 
consider sufficient – as a first step – to define the various industrial logics 
or strategies underlying the M&A: the initial activities of the banks 
involved in the M&A and the geographical dimension of the transaction.  
When examining the effects of M&As on banking performance 
(financial, economic and regulatory), the application of this matrix has 
many advantages:  
1.  It allows the categorisation of M&A transactions according to specific 
characteristics. This takes into consideration the level of 
diversification of the banking activities and the level of geographical 
outreach before and after the transaction.  
2.  The analysis of banking performance before and after an M&A is 
more targeted towards the objectives set in terms of the industrial 
logic of the newly formed institution. Therefore, the results are easier 
to interpret and compare.  
3.  It defines a set of strategies that are useful for analysing the future of 
the banking industry in terms of business model ( a reinforcement of 
specialised versus multi-specialised banking). 
4.  It allows the definition of an optimal strategy59 that enhances banking 
performance (financial/economic and regulatory). In particular, the 
optimal strategy is the solution to an objective function that 
maximises the profit (minimises the cost) of the newly formed entity 
under resources constraints.  
5.  It eases the task of competition authorities in investigating suspicions 
of anti-competitive behaviour.   
6.  It offers a good tool for regulators when examining the development 
of the banking industry in terms of risk and returns.  
By plotting the possible activity profiles and geographical scopes of 
M&As in the banking industry on a matrix (hereinafter called an ‘AG 
matrix’), we identify six industrial logics or strategies (S1-S6), as shown in 
Table 2. 
 
                                                      
59 Ongoing work by the author aims to define a model that computes the most 
desirable combination of activity/geography that allows an optimisation of 
banking performance following a merger or and acquisition.  ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF BANKING M&AS IN EUROPE | 27 
 
Table 2. Activity/geography matrix 
  Geographical scope 
 National  Cross-border  (EU) 
  Same region  Different regions   
Homogeneous  Reinforcement of 
activities locally 
(S1) 
Reinforcement of 
activities nationally 
(S2) 
Reinforcement of 
activities cross-border 
(S5) 
A
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
p
r
o
f
i
l
e
 
Heterogeneous  Expansion of 
activities locally 
(S3) 
Expansion of 
activities nationally 
(S4) 
Expansion of activities 
cross-border 
(S6) 
Legend: 
S1: M&As between institutions with homogenous profiles and operating locally 
aim at focusing the initial activities locally. This strategy is specific to European 
countries with a strong presence of local and regional banks, particularly savings 
and cooperative banks. 
S2: M&As between institutions with homogenous profiles and operating nationally 
aim at focusing the initial activities nationally. 
S3: M&As between institutions with heterogeneous profiles and operating locally 
aim at expanding the range of activities locally. 
S4: M&As between institutions with heterogeneous profiles and operating 
nationally aim at expanding the range of activities nationally. 
S5: M&As between institutions with homogenous profiles and operating across 
border aim at focusing the initial activities at a cross-border level. 
S6: M&As between institutions with heterogeneous profiles and operating across 
border aim at expanding the range of activities at a cross-border level.  
As we illustrate below (Figure 4), the application of the A/G matrix 
can offer a useful tool for managers to decide about their best strategy in 
terms of geographies and activities expansion when studying an M&A 
project. The horizontal axes define the levels of activities and geographical 
expansion for each institution. The interaction between both levels would 
define the generic strategy of the M&A (S1, S2, S3, S4, S4, S5 or S6). This 
approach would therefore allow a manager to define the best strategy of 
the M&A which combines optimally the levels of activities and 
geographical expansion. Theoretically, this translates into optimal 
input/outputs combinations of the two merged entities. However, the 
optimal strategy for a bank should be well quantified – for example, an 
optimal strategy would be the one that fully exploits cost and revenue 
synergies and increases solvency under resources constraints.  
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In the banking sector, when an M&A occurs with the aim of focusing 
their activities locally, domestically or across borders, there is an 
expectation that the resulting enterprise will be able to cut costs and benefit 
from scale economies, while increasing market presence which does not 
necessarily increase market power. Conversely, when an M&A occurs 
between banks with the aim of expanding their activities locally, nationally 
or across borders, there is an expectation of increased revenues and the 
opportunity to benefit from scope economies.  
Opting for one or the other underlying strategy would not only 
impact the profitability and efficiency of the banks involved in the M&A 
transaction, but also would impact their future development and business 
model.  
Bank managers whose objective is to pursue a specialisation strategy 
would be more inclined to opt for M&As that concentrate the initial 
activities of his/her institution.  
On the contrary, if the aim is to pursue a multi-specialisation 
strategy, bank managers would be expected to target institutions with a 
different functional and geographical profile but with large potential for 
complementarities.   
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5.  ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF 
BANKING M&AS IN EUROPE  
We propose to apply this new approach based on the analysis of the 
various strategies underlying banking M&As to assess the performance of 
these operations. To categorise banking M&As, we use the A/G matrix 
built on the interaction between the activity of the banks involved in the 
M&A and the geographical dimension of the transaction. Then, based on a 
categorisation of the M&A, we assess the profitability and the efficiency 
(cost and profit) for the acquirers and the targets before and after the 
operation. The analysis will be based on financial ratios to assess 
profitability and on data envelopment analysis (DEA) to calculate cost and 
profit efficiency.  
5.1  Methodology 
The profitability and efficiency analysis based on balance sheet indicators 
and efficiency scores consists of describing costs, revenue, risk and 
efficiency. Each of these indicators is analysed at least one year before and 
three years after the merger for the acquirers and the targets and compared 
to a control group of non-merged banks along the period 1996-2003 (Table 
A2.1 in Annex 2). The three-year time period was used because it is more 
likely that gains would appear at least one year after the merger and then 
all gains would be realised within three years.  
For the pre-merger period, ratios for both the acquirers and the 
targets are examined to get an indication of the relative performance of the 
acquirer and the target. In addition, ratios for the control group were 
examined to provide a basis for comparing performance of the merged 
institutions to non-merged institutions that are similar in term of size, type 
and location.  
For the post-merger period, the focus of the analysis is on the 
combined institutions for mergers and separate institutions for acquisitions 
relative to the control group. The control group was particularly valuable 
as it permits an assessment of whether any observed changes in the ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF BANKING M&AS IN EUROPE | 31 
 
combined firm simply reflects changes in the economic environment or 
instead were due to the merger or acquisition.  
Post-merger data were compared with the pre-merger data to 
determine what changes occurred in performance following the merger or 
the acquisition (see Table A2.2 in Annex 2).  
We perform a dynamic analysis of cost and profit efficiency and 
profitability on a sample of 71 mergers and acquisitions that took place in 
the period 1996-2000, broken down on the basis of geographical ambitions 
(domestic vs. cross-border) and by their underlying strategies, which will 
be defined subsequently.  
Application of the A/G matrix to assess M&As’ performance 
In this paper, we focus exclusively on banking activities and on the 
transactions that occurred in the EU15 plus Norway. By using the A/G 
matrix, we identify different industrial logics or strategies depending on 
whether the M&As involve banks with homogeneous versus 
heterogeneous activity profiles and whether they are undertaken in the 
same or different geographical areas (local/national versus cross-border 
but within the EU). 
The geographical dimension is defined by looking at the location of 
the bank’s headquarters, whereas the activity profile is defined by reference 
to the banks’ revenue structures. 
It is difficult to define with certainty the activities of European banks 
since disclosure requirements are such that only very few banks provide 
information on the character of their loan portfolios or the different types of 
non-interest income generated by the different business units. For our 
analysis, therefore, we use a pragmatic approach for the definition of 
homogeneous versus heterogeneous activities.60 Although we rely on broad 
revenue and asset-based measures of diversified versus focused activities, 
we do not think this will bias our results since interest versus non-interest 
revenue is a fair indication of whether a bank is pursuing traditional 
intermediation versus other financial activities. 
Our preferred measures are the revenue-based measures since they 
capture the banks’ different sources of income. We calculate the difference 
between the interest revenue from lending divided by total revenue and 
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the difference between non-interest revenue divided by total revenues 
before the transaction for the acquirer and the target to define the activity 
profile of the banks involved in M&A. 
Table 3. Revenue components in banking M&As 
Transaction 
(i)  
Proportion of 
interest 
revenue from 
lending/total 
revenue for 
the acquirer 
before the 
transaction   
Proportion 
of interest 
revenue 
from 
lending/ 
total 
revenue for 
the target 
before the 
transaction  
Difference   Proportion 
of the non-
interest rev- 
enue/total 
revenue for 
the acquirer 
before the 
transaction  
 
Proportion 
of the non -
interest rev- 
enue/total 
revenue for 
the target 
before the 
transaction  
 
Difference 
Transaction 
(1) 
IRa(1) IRt(1)  IRa(1)  - 
IRt(1) 
NIRa(1) NIRt(1)  NIRa(1)  - 
NIRt(1) 
Transaction 
(i) 
IRa (i)  IRt (i)  IRa (i) - IRt 
(i) 
NIRa(i) NIRt(i)  NIRa(i)  - 
NIRt(i) 
 
When breaking down the revenue into interest revenue from lending 
and non-interest revenue (revenues from commissions and trading 
activities), we could define the different banks’ activities. The ultimate 
objective is to classify the activities into homogeneous or heterogeneous 
profiles, according to the following basic guidelines:  
•  The proportion of interest revenue over total revenue is an indication of 
the extent to which the banks are involved in the traditional activities of 
deposit and lending. 
•  The proportion of non-interest revenue over total revenue is an 
indication of the involvement of the banks in other activities, ranging 
from trading and other financial services (underwriting and 
distributing securities, providing payments and cash-related services, 
etc.). 
The table below shows the calculations used to produce ratios before 
the announcement of the transaction  
Table 4. Ratio calculations prior to announcement of a transaction 
Data relative to transactions at year (X)  Before (Xb)  
1996  X 
1997  ((X-1)+(X))/2 
1998  ((X-2)+(X-1)+(X))/3 
1999  ((X-3)+(X-2)+(X-1)+(X))/4 
2000  ((X-4)+(X-3)+(X-2)+(X-1)+(X))/5 ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF BANKING M&AS IN EUROPE | 33 
 
Two alternatives are taken into consideration: if the values of these 
ratios calculated for the acquirer and the target before the announcement 
belong to the same interval, while keeping the difference less than 20%, 
then we consider that their profiles are similar. If the values do not belong 
to the same interval, and the difference is more than 20%, then we consider 
that they have different profiles.  
The choice of the threshold of 20% is somewhat arbitrary,61 but it was 
confirmed by a qualitative analysis based on other ratios in the balance 
sheet (such as the proportion of investment activities in total assets, the 
percentage of off-balance sheet in total assets, etc). This choice was 
necessary in order to get on with the business of conducting these analyses. 
More precise data on banks are simply not available. 
Justification of the efficiency analysis method 
Several techniques – parametric or non-parametric – have been proposed in 
the literature to measure efficiency using the frontier approaches. They 
mainly differ in the distributional assumptions used to disentangle 
inefficiency differences from random errors. The parametric Stochastic 
Frontier Approach (SFA) and the non-parametric Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) are the most used tools to measure efficiency, taking into 
account that the literature considers both techniques as equally 
satisfactory.62 We chose the DEA approach as we consider it to be a more 
appropriate tool in our analysis since it does not require an assumption of a 
functional form for the frontier relating inputs and outputs, particularly 
when the sample used to evaluate efficiency before and after an M&A is 
composed of banks of different sizes, types and countries. Also, DEA does 
not assume any distributional form for the inefficiency term and it is easier 
to accommodate multiple input and output models. And finally, the banks 
are directly compared against a peer or combination of peers.  
The DEA approach was initially developed by Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978) who proposed a model that measure technical efficiency 
scores under constant returns to scale (CRS). The CRS assumption has 
however a limited scope since it is only appropriate when operating at an 
optimal scale. Imperfect competition and constraints on finance may cause 
                                                      
61 The same methodology has been tested in Baele et al. (2006).  
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a Decision Making Unit (DMU) not to be operating at optimal scale. 
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) described a revised model including 
variable returns to scale (VRS), thus allowing the computation of pure 
technical efficiency and scale efficiency. The VRS specification has been the 
most commonly used specification in the 1990s.  
The DEA model is a linear programming-based method for 
evaluating the relative efficiency of a set of decision-making units (DMUs). 
The DEA frontier is formed as the linear combination that connects the set 
of ‘best-practice observations’ in the data set under analysis. As a 
consequence, the DEA efficiency score for a specific DMU is not defined by 
an absolute standard or ‘theoretical maximum’, but it is defined relative to 
the other DMUs in the specific data set under consideration.  
DEA suffers from its limitations, however, in that it does not consider 
the existence of an error term (or ‘noise’) and it cannot be used to conduct 
conventional statistical tests of hypotheses in particular when testing the 
presence of environmental variables. In that case, it seems preferable to use 
the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) rather than DEA.  
In this paper, we use the non-parametric DEA approach63 to estimate 
cost and profit efficiency scores.64 The frontier is obtained by means of 
linear combination of efficient firms contained in the sample. Although cost 
efficiency obtained by means of non-parametric techniques has been a 
widely used procedure, the estimatio n  o f  p r o f i t  e f f i c i e n c y  b y  n o n -
parametric techniques has rarely been done. Cost efficiency (profit 
efficiency) measures the distance between each bank’s costs (profits) vis-à-
vis the ‘best practice’ in the industry when producing the same bundle of 
outputs. Cost efficiency provides an indication of wastes in the production 
process and of the optimality of the chosen mix of inputs as a function of 
their respective prices. Profit efficiency, on the other hand, provides an 
indication of the optimality of the chosen mix of inputs and outputs. The 
comparison of cost and profit efficiency scores may give an indication of a 
likely market power effect.  
                                                      
63 Berger & Mester (1997) and Maudos & Pastor (2003). 
64 The efficiency of a firm consists of two components: technical efficiency, which 
reflects the ability of a firm to obtain maximal output from a given set of inputs, 
and  allocative efficiency, which reflects the ability of a firm to use the inputs in 
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The non-parametric DEA model uses linear programming to find the 
best practice bank in the sample (i=1,….N) that reflects minimum costs in 
producing the observed output vector Q, (yi =yi1, ……, yiq)
+ + ℜ ∈
q  that sell at 
prices (ri = ri1, ……riq ) 
+ + ℜ ∈
q given the a vector of P inputs (xi = xi1,……., 
xip) 
+ + ℜ ∈
p for which they pay prices (wi=wi1,…….wip) 
+ + ℜ ∈
q . 
The cost efficiency of each bank j can be computed by solving the 
following problem of linear programming: 
 
pj
p
pjx w Min∑  
 
Subject to  q y y jq iq
i
i ∀ ≥ ∑λ  
      p x x jp ip
i
i ∀ ≤ ∑λ  
      N i i
i
i ,....... 1 , 0 , 1 = ≥ = ∑ λ λ  
The solution 
* *
1
* ,...... jp j j x x x = corresponds to the input demand vector 
that minimises the costs with the given price of inputs and is obtained from 
a linear combination of banks that produces at least as much of each of the 
inputs using the same or less amount of inputs, and the cost will be 
* *
pj pj j x w C ∑ = which, by definition, is less than or equal to the cost of the 
bank j ( pj pj j x w C ∑ = ). 
The cost efficiency65 for bank j (CEj) can be calculated as follows: 
 
     
∑
∑
= =
p
pj pj
p
pj pj
j
j
j x w
x w
C
C
CE
*
*
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where  1 ≤ j CE represents the ratio between the minimum cost 
*
j C  
associated with the use of the input vector 
*
j x  that minimises the costs and 
the observed costs Cj for bank.  
Equally, the alternative profit efficiency66 is empirically calculated 
with the following linear programming formally expressed:  
 
pj
p
pj j x w MaxR ∑ −  
 
Subject to  
 
N i
p x x
q y y
R R
i
i
i
jp ip
i
i
jq iq
i
i
j i
i
i
,...... 1 ; 0 ; 1 = ≥ =
∀ ≤
∀ ≥
≥
∑
∑
∑
∑
λ λ
λ
λ
λ
 
The solution of the linear programming corresponds to the revenue 
*
j R and input demand 
* *
1
* ,...... jp j j x x x = which maximises profits given the 
prices of the inputs w. This solution is obtained from a linear combination 
of firms that produce at least as much of each of the outputs using a smaller 
or equal quantity of inputs and obtains at least as much revenues as bank j.  
 
Alternative profit efficiency is then calculated as follows:  
 
∑
∑
−
−
= =
p
pj pj j
p
pj pj j
j
j
j x w R
x w R
AP
P
APE * * *  
                                                      
66 Berger & Mester (1997) and Rogers (1998). ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF BANKING M&AS IN EUROPE | 37 
 
Where APEj represents the ratio between the observed profits 
( pj
p
pj j j x w R P ∑ − = ) and the maximum profits  pj
p
pj j j x w R AP
* * * ∑ − =  
associated with the maximum revenue and the input demand 
* *
1
* ,...... jp j j x x x =  that maximises profit for bank j. 
In applying DEA, we adopted the intermediation approach proposed 
by Sealey & Lindley (1977). It assumes that the bank collects deposits to 
transform them, using labour and capital, into loans as opposed to the 
production approach which views the bank as using labour and capital to 
produce deposits and loans. According to the empirical literature,67 the 
choice of either approach may have an impact on the level of efficiency 
scores but it does not imply strong modifications in their rankings.  
Two outputs are included, loans and investment assets.68 The inputs, 
whose prices are used to estimate cost and alternative profit frontiers, 
include labour, physical capital and borrowed funds.  
As data on the number of employees are not available, the price of 
labour is measured by the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets.69 The 
price of physical capital is defined as the ratio of other non-interest 
expenses relative to fixed assets. The price of borrowed funds is measured 
by the ratio of paid interest to all funding. Total costs are interest costs and 
non-interest costs. To measure total profit, we use operating gross income,70 
which does not include loan provisioning as provisioning rules differ from 
one country to another one in Europe.  
Balance-sheet ratios analysis 71 
Three sets of balance-sheet ratios are examined below, including cost, 
profitability and risk ratios.  
1.  Cost ratios include a cost to income ratio, which permits one to 
examine total costs (non-interest expenses and interest expenses) 
                                                      
67 Wheelock and Wilson (1995), Berger, Leusner and Mingo (1997).  
68 This item includes the ‘other earning assets’ in the FitchRatings terminology, 
which are the earning assets other than loans.  
69 Dietsch & Weill (2001), Altunbas et al. (2001) and Maudos et al. (2002).  
70 That is, profit before provisions and taxes. 
71 Rhoades (1998). 38 | RYM AYADI 
 
relative to total operating revenues. This ratio reflects the ability of 
the bank to generate revenue from its expenditures. Furthermore, for 
many banks, revenues reflect income earned from the balance sheet 
as well from the off-balance sheet.72 
It is also of special interest to break down total costs into non-interest 
costs (personnel expenses, back-office operations and branches, 
amortisation expense of intangible assets) and interest costs (cost of 
financial capital) as a share of total assets. The former should be 
directly affected by the cost savings that are frequently cited as a 
result of horizontal bank mergers. The later may be significantly 
affected by the way in which the bank obtains deposits. For example, 
a bank may choose to shift from using core deposits (predominately 
retail deposits) as a source of funds to using purchased money. 
Obtaining core deposits tends to incur high non-interest expenses 
from the fixed costs of running the branches and the personnel, while 
the opposite is true for obtaining purchased money, especially when 
interest rates are relatively low. The advantage of using total assets as 
a denominator in the cost ratios is that assets reflects the earnings 
base of the bank and they are not highly variable from one year to 
another, whereas revenues tend to be more variable.  
2.  The profitability ratios include the return on assets (ROA), which is the 
ratio of gross income to average assets and the return on equity (ROE) 
which is the ratio of gross or net income to equity. The gross income73 
measure is preferable to net income74 in order to avoid the differences 
in taxation between European countries. ROA is a good overall 
indicator of a banking organisation’s performance in that it illustrates 
the ability of a bank to generate profits from the assets at its disposal. 
It has the disadvantage however of not accounting for the profits 
                                                      
72 Among the large banks, derivatives are important off-balance sheet items, which 
may be larger as measured by notional value than total assets. For many other 
banks, unused commitments such as credit cards and home equity lines of credit, 
represent major off-balance sheet items that are sometimes larger in value than 
assets. Standby and commercial letters of credit represent an important although 
much smaller source of off-balance sheet items primarily for larger banks. Off-
balance sheet activities result in expenses and also revenues.  
73 Income before taxes.  
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generated from the off-balance sheet operations. ROE is an alternative 
measure of profitability designed to reflect the return to owners’ 
investment. It has also a disadvantage in that the denominator may 
vary substantially across banks, even those of identical size due to the 
discretionary choices by management as to the mix between equity 
and debt capital as well as the total amount of capital held by a firm.  
Finally, it is also worth decomposing total revenue into its main 
streams: interest and non-interest revenues to measure the 
diversification of income. In addition, we will measure the ability of 
the bank to generate revenue by the asset productivity ratio, which is 
based on total revenues as a share of total assets.  
3.  Risk indicators are used to determine the change in the risk profile of 
a bank after a merger or an acquisition. For example, the capital ratio, 
which is defined as equity to total assets, indicates the capital 
strength of the bank and its ability to absorb credit and other losses. 
The solvency ratio, measured by the loan-loss provision to net interest 
revenue, provides an indication of the extent to which the bank has 
made provisions to cover credit losses. The higher the ratio, the larger 
the amount of expected bad loans on the books and the higher the 
risks despite having been provisioned.  
5.2  Data 
M&A sample 
The sample contained 71 completed mergers and acquisitions executed by 
banks headquartered in the EU15 plus Norway. The announcement dates 
ranged between 1 January 1996 and 1 January 2001. The deals were 
primarily obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities, M&A SDC 
database and press coverage. The period under scrutiny is of particular 
interest because it immediately follows the regulatory changes associated 
with the completion of the single market programme in the EU, and it also 
covers the period before and after the introduction of the euro. Since a 
breakdown is made between the domestic and the cross-border deals, both 
the single market programme and EMU are expected to be catalysts for 
cross-border M&A activity in banking.   
All the deals included in our study are horizontal takeovers that can 
either be classified as complete mergers (involving the combination of the 
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49% of voting rights (in which the acquiring bank buys a controlling equity 
stake in the target bank, and both banks remain legally separate entities), in 
order to take into account all the operations having generated a transfer of 
capital control.  
The targets and the acquirers are banking institutions (commercial 
banks, savings institutions, cooperatives banks and public credit 
institutions), as defined in the second banking directive. Insurance and 
‘securities’ are excluded.  
To explore the sample, statistical analysis on the number of 
transactions was performed.  
Table A3.1 in Annex gives the number of transactions by year and 
country of targets; Table A3.2 displays the number of acquirers and targets 
per country; Table A3.3 shows the number of transactions per strategies per 
country and Table A3.4 shows the number of transactions per strategies 
and years.  
The control group 
The control group is composed of non-merging or majority-acquired 
European banking institutions that meet the same selection criteria as the 
M&A sample. Foreign branches and subsidiaries that have their parent 
institution outside the EU15 or Norway are excluded. We also excluded 
from our sample institutions that were involved in a merger or a majority 
acquisition. These banks are mainly commercial, cooperative and savings 
banks. We excluded subsidiaries of foreign banks, specialised financial 
institutions and central banks.  
The number of banks of the control group by country is given in 
Table A3.5 in Annex 3. All the data used in the empirical analysis are 
derived from Bankscope, a FitchRatings/Bureau Van Dijk international 
database, which provides annual income and balance sheet data for banks.  
5.3  Results 
The efficiency measures are the results of the implementation of a variable 
returns to scale (VRS) model.75 Precisely, we perform a dynamic efficiency 
                                                      
75 In our empirical analysis, computer routines are carried out using DEAP 2.1 
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analysis on a sample of 71 bank-to-bank mergers and acquisitions 
(including 11 cross-border transactions) completed over the period 1996-
2000.  
The construction of cost and profit frontiers was based on a large 
sample of approximately 587 European banks located in the same EU 
countries.  
In addition, the control group was constituted to provide a basis for 
comparing performance of the merged institutions to non-merged 
institutions that are similar in term of size, type and location. This group 
excludes the pre-specified sample of 71 bank-to-bank mergers and majority 
acquisitions and more generally all the banks that were involved in a 
takeover during the same year. The period of observation is 1996-2003. We 
consider unconsolidated balance sheet data whenever possible.  
Banking M&As and performance – Cost and profit efficiency indicators 
(Annex 4) 
Our efficiency results indicate that banks’ cost efficiency for the domestic 
transactions slightly improves following the merger or acquisition. This 
improvement is more pronounced for the targets as they were much less 
efficient than the acquiring banks prior to the transaction. In other words, 
targets benefit more from the transaction than acquirers.76 
This result supports two theses: the first is a transfer of best practices 
of the acquiring bank to the target and the second, which is related to the 
first, is the existence of an efficient market for corporate control in 
European banks. This market would detect banks having a potential to 
improve their costs management. These findings suggest that M&As would 
be more successful in cases where the target is poorly managed in terms of 
costs. 
The average cost-efficiency scores displayed in domestic transactions 
hide interesting results when applying the AG matrix.  
When M&A transactions aim at focusing activities in the same local 
area, acquirers and targets fail to improve their cost efficiency scores. This 
result contradicts the cost savings related-motive put forward by managers 
when justifying this type of transaction.  
                                                      
76 These results are confirmed in Vander Vennet (1996), Altunbas & Ibanez (2004) 
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These findings confirm that the potential of exploiting scale 
economies is limited if not non-existent in this type of transaction. This 
could be explained by the fact that after an M&A, the new entity has 
reached a critical mass beyond which any opportunity to reduce costs is 
exhausted. This could also be explained by the limited scope to reduce 
costs owing to the rigidity of the labour market77 and the difficulties 
inherent to the post-integration process. Finally, this result may also be a 
consequence of limited opportunities to transfer best practices or a result of 
the manager’s inability to reduce costs.  
In the case where M&As aim at focusing activities in different local 
areas, the consolidating banks improve their cost-efficiency scores. The 
improvement is more pronounced for the targets. However, there seems to 
be a high potential for improving cost-efficiency scores for this type of 
transaction, where banks are operating in different local areas, since their 
cost-efficiency score is below the average for domestic transactions. This 
finding supports the hypothesis in which scale economies and transfer of 
best practices could be more easily exploited in this type of transactions.78  
When M&A transactions aim at diversifying activities in the same 
local area, cost efficiency scores are unchanged for the targets, while a 
slight deterioration is experienced by the acquirers.79 It is important to note 
that the cost-efficiency scores for the acquirers (and respectively the targets) 
in this type of transaction are substantially higher than the average cost-
efficiency scores for the acquirers (and the targets) in the domestic 
transactions. Despite the slight reduction of cost-efficiency scores for the 
acquirers, the consolidating banks have succeeded in keeping the cost-
efficiency level above the average. This finding would support the 
hypothesis that scale and scope economies could be more easily exploited 
in this type of transactions.  
When M&A transactions aim at diversifying activities and geographical 
reach domestically, acquirers and targets fail to improve cost efficiency scores.80 
                                                      
77 Focarelli, Panetta & Salleo (2002).  
78 This result confirms the findings of Beitel et al. (2004) in Europe, DeLong (2001) 
and Cornett et al. (2000) in the US. 
79 This result confirms the findings of Beitel et al. (2004) in Europe, DeLong (2001) 
and Cornett et  al. (2000) in the US. 
80 This result confirms the findings of Beitel et al. (2004) in Europe, DeLong (2001) 
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This finding is explained by the inability of these banks to exploit scale and 
scope economies, which could be a result of bad post-M&A management or 
all of the difficulties inherent to consolidating banks that operate in 
different activity segments.  
In general, acquirers and targets involved in the domestic 
transactions are more cost-efficient than the banks of the control group 
before and after the M&A. Cost-efficiency scores have slightly improved 
for the control group. However, this improvement is below any positive 
change experienced by the acquirers and the targets.   
With respect to profit-efficiency scores,81 we found a positive 
variation for the acquiring and target banks.82 Indeed, prior to the 
transaction, acquirers displayed higher scores than the targets. After the 
transaction, targets enjoyed more pronounced improvement in scores. This 
finding implies that European banks have exploited the opportunities to 
improve their profit efficiency either through anti-competitive pricing 
and/or pricing change and/or scale and scope economies and/or the 
advantages of a multi-specialised banking model. 
The average change in the profit-efficiency scores confirms the same 
trend for M&A transactions focusing on activities and geography. Indeed, 
acquirers and targets succeeded in improving their scores. However, in this 
same type of transactions, cost efficiency scores dropped, this would 
suggest that the improvement of profit efficiency scores would be a result 
of an increase of revenues due to a market power manipulative effect on 
the local market.83 
Similarly, when an M&A transaction has focused its activities in 
different areas domestically, both the acquirer and the target have 
improved their profit efficiency scores as compared to other transaction 
                                                      
81 These results should be interpreted with caution owing to a number of limits of 
the DEA methodology, particularly the non-availability of output prices.  
82 Results confirmed by Vander Vennet (1996), Altunbas & Ibanez (2004) and Ayadi 
& Pujals (2005) for European banks; by Houston, James & Ryngaert (2001) for US 
banks; and by Focarelli & Panetta (2002) for Italian banks.  
83 This type of transactions could potentially lead to a concentration increase in a 
given local market. The conclusions of Berger & Hannan (1998) confirmed that 
higher concentration would result in a price increase and thus revenue increase. 
Moreover, in a less competitive market, motivations to reduce costs are minimum 
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types and to the control group. This type of transaction improved both cost 
and profit efficiency scores. This finding indicates that there is a higher 
incentive to improve profit and cost efficiency in transactions that aim at 
expanding operations in different areas domestically.  
However, in the transactions aiming at diversifying activities in the 
same local area, acquirers experienced an increase of their profit efficiency 
scores,84 whereas targets experienced the opposite effect. The latter were 
more profit efficient than the acquirers before the transaction. In this type 
of transaction, acquirers benefited from revenue synergies due to the 
complementarity of activities. The negative evolution of the targets’ 
efficiency scores could be explained by the problems experienced by a few 
banks in the sample.  
In the transactions that diversify activities and geographies, targets 
experienced a clear improvement in their profit efficiency scores, whereas a 
slight deterioration occurred for the acquirers. This finding indicates that 
targets have markedly benefited from revenue synergies due to activities 
and geographies extension.  
For the cross-border transactions, our cost efficiency results show a 
deterioration of the acquirers’ scores and a slight improvement for the 
targets’ scores.85 It is also interesting to note that the targets involved in 
cross-border transactions were more efficient in terms of cost than the ones 
involved in domestic transactions.86 This is an indication that the potential 
targets involved in the cross-border transactions are amongst the most cost 
efficient in the industry. For the acquirers, it is obvious that the potential of 
improving cost efficiency is limited due to the additional costs resulting 
from the difficulties in managing large and complex organisations across 
borders, not to mention the over-evaluation of the premium paid to the 
shareholders of the target.  
When applying the AG matrix, cross-border transactions that 
concentrate activities fail to improve cost efficiency scores for the acquirers. 
                                                      
84 These findings are confirmed by Vander Vennet (1996).  
85 These findings are confirmed in Vander Vennet (2002 a and b) and Ayadi & 
Pujals (2005) and also in Beitel et al. (2004) for European banks and Houston & 
Ryngaert (1997) for US banks, who concluded that transactions focusing on 
geographies are more successful than the ones diversifying geographies.  
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The deterioration of the acquirers’ s c o r e s  i s  m o r e  p r o n o u n c e d  i n  t h e  
diversifying transactions’ type. The targets, instead, improve their cost 
efficiency scores for both types of transactions. Clearly, it is easier for cross-
border transactions to improve cost efficiency when banks operate in the 
same activities.  
With respect to profit efficiency, acquirers and targets failed to 
improve their scores although they displayed higher scores as compared to 
the banks involved in domestic transactions and those of the control 
group.87 The deterioration of profit efficiency scores is more pronounced 
for the acquirers.  
When looking at focusing versus diversifying M&A transactions, 
both failed to improve profit efficiency scores for the acquirers. However, 
the deterioration is more pronounced in the focusing M&A transactions. 
For the targets, scores have slightly improved in the diversifying M&A 
transactions. This finding should not be generalised, however, since it is 
based on one only transaction, and given the fact that the target has 
displayed a low profit efficiency level as compared to the targets’ average 
score involved in cross-border transactions.  
The findings related to cross-border transactions would suggest that, 
despite the potential of cost and revenue synergies promised by focusing 
and diversifying transactions, there are still some difficulties to resolve 
before it can be fully realised.  
These findings confirm the conclusions of the survey conducted by 
the European Commission in 2004 and 2005 on a sample of 355 financial 
institutions as mandated by the European Council in Scheveningenin in 
September 2004 (see Annex 1 for a summary of the results). These 
conclusions confirm that the most relevant impediments identified are the 
inadequate cross-border cost and revenue synergies. The synergies are 
insufficient to offset the M&A costs and fail to generate a sufficient return 
on investment. This lack of synergies is explained by the following factors: 
•  Fragmentation of retail markets, related to the difficulty of selling 
similar products in different domestic markets; 
                                                      
87 These findings are confirmed by Vander Vennet (1996, 2002a), Altunbas & 
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•  Divergent supervisory rules and practices, e.g. multiple reporting 
requirements, divergence of supervisory practices and complex 
supervisory approval processes;  
•  Legal impediments to corporate expansion and re-organisation, e.g. 
taxation on dividends, VAT and other forms of double taxation, 
employment legislation and legal structures of the companies; and 
•  Potential reluctance on the part of consumers or employees to accept 
takeovers and acquisitions from foreign companies, especially those 
of smaller savings or cooperative institutions. 
Banking M&As and performance – balance-sheet indicators (Annex 4) 
For all transactions, our results, based on the cost to income ratio (CIR), 
show that the acquirers are more cost efficient than the targets and the 
banks of the control group. After the transaction, the CIR has improved, 
implying a cost reduction for the acquirers and the targets. This reduction 
is more pronounced for the targets since they display an initial higher 
potential for improvement than the acquirers. It is also interesting to note 
that the reduction in terms of interest costs is more important than non-
interest costs.  
The domestic transactions succeeded in improving the CIR and in 
reducing total costs. This finding confirms the potential of cost savings of 
this type of transactions. 
The average evolution of the CIR confirms that for the transactions 
aiming at focusing activities in the same local area, acquirers and targets 
have improved their CIR and reduced total costs in their total assets. This 
finding supports the hypothesis of the cost savings’ potential of this type of 
transaction. Also, this improvement could be explained by a more than 
proportionate increase of the income (as compared to the cost reduction) 
due to either an increase of the activity volume resulting from the merger 
or acquisition or a change in pricing policy of banks after the transaction. 
However, the results displayed in the cost efficiency analysis are consistent 
with a deterioration of the acquirers’ scores after the transaction. This 
difference is explained by the fact that the cost reduction showed by the 
financial indicators is insufficient to maintain or improve the cost efficiency 
scores. Consequently, one might think about the optimal level of cost 
reduction corresponding to the U-shaped cost function. Therefore, it is 
interesting to further explore the optimum level of cost reduction from 
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mention that the limits inherent to the financial indicators are such that the 
prices of the inputs are not taken into consideration, which is not the case 
for the cost efficiency analysis.  
For the transactions aimed at focusing activities in different local 
areas, the CIR has improved, while total costs, in particular interest costs, 
were reduced for the acquirers and even more dramatically for the 
targets.88 The reduction of non-interest costs seems more difficult to achieve 
for the reasons stated previously. Moreover, this could also relate to the 
existence of a number of savings banks and other banks in the proximity 
that depend strongly on the network of their branches. The results of the 
cost efficiency analysis confirm these conclusions. 
When M&A transactions aim at diversifying activities in the same 
local area, the cost efficiency analysis showed that acquirers are the most 
efficient, despite a slight deterioration of their scores after the transaction. 
The results displayed by the financial indicators analysis showed that 
despite an improvement of the acquirers’ CIR, these banks are the least 
efficient as measured against the average score of their counterparts in the 
domestic transactions. A plausible explanation would be that these banks 
have failed to increase their revenues while maintaining their total costs. 
Similarly, the fairly cost-efficient targets have seen their CIR deteriorate by 
more than 20% after the transaction. This is also an indication that the 
difficulties in generating additional revenues while maintaining the total 
costs experienced by the acquirers are transferred to the targets. Adding to 
the conclusions of the empirical research on the subject, these findings 
show that, while best practices could be transferred from the acquirers to 
the benefit of the targets after the transaction, the opposite scenario occurs 
when the acquirer is experiencing difficulties.   
In the case of M&As creating diversified activities and geographies, 
acquirers improved their CIR, despite a deterioration of their cost efficiency 
scores. This finding indicates that these banks generate more revenues 
while maintaining their total costs at the same level. For the targets, the 
deterioration of their cost efficiency scores could be explained by their 
failure to control their non-interest costs; nevertheless, they succeeded 
improving their CIR thanks to an increase of revenues.  
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1996-2000 pushing banks to seek re-financing in the inter-bank market.   48 | RYM AYADI 
 
Our results, which are based on ROA (return on assets) and ROE 
(return on equity), showed a slight improvement for the acquirers involved 
in the domestic transactions, which was more pronounced for the targets, 
while the control group showed the opposite trend. Moreover, the decrease 
of interest revenues was substituted by an increase of other non-interest 
revenues for the acquirers and the targets. Productivity deteriorated for the 
acquirers, targets and the control group alike. This is an indication that the 
productivity of assets is a general problem for European banks.   
The average trend of ROA and ROE for the banks involved in 
domestic transactions showed that for M&As that concentrate the same 
activities in a single local area, both the acquirers and targets have 
improved their profitability. This improvement is more pronounced for the 
targets since they displayed more potential for improvement before the 
transaction. Productivity has also deteriorated for this type of transactions.  
In the cases of M&As aiming at concentrating activities in different 
local areas, both the acquirers and targets have improved their ROA and 
ROE. This improvement is more pronounced for the targets due to their 
low profitability before the transaction. Productivity has also deteriorated 
after the transaction.  
When M&As aim at diversifying activities in the same local area, our 
results show that the acquirers have slightly improved their ROA, while no 
improvement was registered for the targets. This finding confirms the 
results of the profit efficiency indicators for this type of transaction. The 
ROE has displayed the opposite evolution.89 Productivity of assets has also 
deteriorated for this type of transaction.  
When M&A transactions aim at diversifying activities and 
geographies domestically, acquirers and targets have both improved their 
profitability. The most surprising is that even the productivity has 
improved. These findings confirm the benefits of multi-specialised banking 
models. However, the profit efficiency analysis has shown a deterioration 
of the scores for the acquirers, which could indicate the incapacity of 
management to fully exploit the benefits of revenue synergies due to the X- 
inefficiencies.90 
                                                      
89 The targets of this type of transaction exhibited a low profitability level in terms 
of ROA and ROE.  
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When measuring the solvency ratio, acquirers and targets have 
experienced a positive change in all types of transactions. This could 
explain the behaviour of national prudential authorities in defending 
domestic transactions. 
In cross-border transactions, acquirers are more cost-efficient in 
terms of CIR than the acquirers involved in domestic transactions, but this 
type of transaction has had a negative impact on the acquirers’ and targets’ 
CIR. Despite a slight reduction of total costs in the assets, these transactions 
do not generate sufficient revenues, compared to their expenses.  
For both types of M&A (focusing and diversifying) transactions, the 
cost-efficiency analysis showed a deterioration of the scores for the 
acquirers, despite their success in reducing total costs. For the targets, the 
cost-efficiency analysis showed an improvement of their scores which is 
partly explained by the reduction of their total costs. The CIR has neither 
improved for the acquirers nor for the targets not only because total costs 
were not controlled as expected but also because they failed to generate 
sufficient additional revenues while maintaining the same expenses. 
Our results of the profitability analysis confirm that domestic 
transactions are more profitable in terms of ROA and ROE than cross-
border transactions, despite the high profitability level of banks involved in 
cross-border transactions. Indeed, cross-border transactions have failed to 
improve profitability, regardless of their type.  
Finally, our results show the negative impact of cross-border M&As 
on solvency.  
5.4  Conclusions 
In our assessment of the performance of European banks involved in 71 
M&A transactions in the period 1996-2000, we showed that the different 
transactions’ categories, including focusing versus diversifying activities 
and geographies, would have different impacts on banking performance. 
We believe, therefore, that this would indicate that the activity-geography 
combination would be a factor of success or failure for these transactions. 
In general, our results confirm the conclusions of previous empirical 
research which finds that domestic transactions have a higher chance to 
reduce costs, increase profits and achieve higher cost and profit efficiency.  
However, M&A transactions that concentrate activities in the same 
local area could raise anti-competitive concerns since the improvement of 
p r o f i t  e f f i c i e n c y  i s  s h o w n  t o  b e  driven by an increase in revenues 50 | RYM AYADI 
 
suggestive of a pricing policy change rather than an improvement of cost 
efficiency. This result should be interpreted with caution, however, owing 
to the limitation of data collection by banking activity segment and also the 
unavailability of output prices.  
Further, it seems that the cost-reduction potential in M&A 
transactions aimed at achieving multi-specialisation is limited. This result 
confirms that it is more difficult to reach a critical mass when a bank 
simultaneously runs several activities, thereby reducing the opportunities 
to exploit scale economies. However, this limitation would suggest the 
need to examine any opportunity to exploit scope economies in the cost 
function.  
Finally, in our sample, cross-border transactions have failed to 
improve performance both in terms of cost and profits. These results could 
be clearly explicable in view of the obstacles that impede cross-border cost 
and revenue synergies. Therefore, to achieve an efficient, competitive and 
integrated European banking market, policy-makers should continue their 
efforts to tackle the most relevant obstacles identified by the European 
Commission’s survey in 2005. 
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ANNEX 1. THE FINDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION’S SURVEY ON CROSS-
BORDER CONSOLIDATION IN THE EU 
FINANCIAL SECTOR 
 
 Intensity  Especially  relevant 
for: 
I. Elements that lower the economic value of cross-
border acquisitions 
­­­   
30. Non-overlapping fixed costs*  +++  Across the board 
I.1 Difficulties in selling the same products across 
countries 
ªªª 
29. Different product mixes 
21. Discriminatory tax treatments 
20. Specific domestic tax breaks 
15. Uncertainty on VAT regime 
11. Divergent consumer protection rules 
13. Differences in private law 
+++ 
+++ 
+++ 
++ 
++ 
+ 
Smaller institutions 
I.2 Implications of supervision for cross-border 
institutions 
ªª 
27. Multiple reporting requirements 
26. Divergences in supervisory practices 
25. Supervisory approval processes 
+++ 
++ 
++ 
Large and very large 
institutions 
I.3 Legal impediments to corporate expansion and 
reorganisation 
ªª 
22. Taxation on dividends 
9. Employment legislation 
3. Legal structures 
18. Inter-group VAT  
16. Exit tax on capital gains 
+++ 
++ 
++ 
+ 
+ 
Large institutions, 
with cross-border 
M&A experience or 
having attempted a 
cross-border M&A 
(except for dividends 
taxation which was 
raised by all types of 
institutions) 
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II. Elements contributing to an 
unfavourable/disabling environment 
­­   
35. Political interference 
39. Political concessions 
24. Misuse of supervisory powers 
4. Limits or controls on foreign participations 
2. Opaque decision making processes 
5. Defence mechanisms 
6. Impediments to effective control 
+++ 
+ 
++ 
++ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Share capital 
companies, large and 
very large 
institutions, with 
cross-border M&A 
experience or having 
attempted a cross-
border M&A 
III. Consequences of individual perception of EU 
foreign entities 
­­   
36. Employees' reluctance 
40. Consumer mistrust in foreign entities 
+++ 
++ 
Smaller institutions, 
cooperative and 
savings institutions 
* The number next to each item corresponds to the numbering of the background paper that 
served as a reference for the online survey. 
Source: European Commission (2005).  
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ANNEX 2. CALCULATION PROCEDURES 
 
Table A2.1 Ratios display during the period of investigation 
Ratios relative 
to transactions 
at year  (X) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1996   X  X+1 X+2 X+3 X+4 X+5 X+6 X+7 
1997   X-1  X  X+1 X+2 X+3 X+4 X+5 X+6 
1998   X-2  X-1  X  X+1 X+2 X+3 X+4 X+5 
1999   X-3  X-2  X-1  X  X+1 X+2 X+3 X+4 
2000 X-4  X-3  X-2  X-1  X  X+1 X+2 X+3 
 
 
Table A2.2 Calculation of ratios prior to and after the announcement of the 
transaction  
Ratios relative 
to transactions 
at year (X) 
Before (Xb)   After (Xa)  D = Xb-Xa  
1996 X  ((X+1)+(X+2)+(X+3)+(X+4)+(X+
5)+(X+6)+(X+7))/7 
D1 
1997 ((X-1)+(X))/2 ((X+1)+(X+2)+(X+3)+(X+4)+(X+
5)+(X+6))/6 
D2 
1998 ((X-2)+(X-1)+(X))/3  ((X+1)+(X+2)+(X+3)+(X+4)+(X+
5))/5 
D3 
1999 ((X-3)+(X-2)+(X-
1)+(X))/4 
((X+1)+(X+2)+(X+3)+(X+4))/4 D4 
2000 ((X-4)+(X-3)+(X-2)+(X-
1)+(X))/5 
((X+1)+(X+2)+(X+3))/3 D5 
Source: Author calculations.  
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ANNEX 3. BACKGROUND DATA ON M&A SAMPLE 
Table A3.1 Number of transactions by year and country of target 
Country   1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  Total % 
Portugal  1  2  1  1  1  6  8% 
Denmark   0  0  1  1  1  3  4% 
Finland  0  1  0  0  0  1  1% 
Sweden  2  0  0  0  0  2  3% 
Spain    0  6  5  5  1  17  24% 
Germany  0  2  2  1  0  5  7% 
France   3  4  1  3  1  12  17% 
Italy  0  7  10  5  3  25  35% 
Total   6  22  20  16  7  71  100% 
%  8%  31%  28%  23%  10%  100%  
 
 
Table A3.2 Acquirers and targets by country  
Country   Acquirers  Targets  Total 
Portugal  6 8  14 
Denmark   2 3  5 
Finland  1 1  2 
Sweden  3 2  5 
Spain   10 15  25 
Germany  5 4  9 
Austria  0 1  1 
France   10 12  22 
Italy  19 25  44 
Luxembourg   1 0  1 
Total   57 71  128 
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Table A3.3 The number of transactions per strategy per country  
Country   S1  S2  S3  S4  S5  S6  Total  
Portugal  2  3  0  1  0  0  6 
Denmark   0  0  2  0  1  0  3 
Finland  0  0  0  0  1  0  1 
Sweden   1  0  1  0  0  0  2 
Spain    1  10  0  0  5  1  17 
Germany   1  0  1  1  2  0  5 
France   6  2  2  1  0  1  12 
Italy   5  18  1  1  0  0  25 
Total   16  33  7  4  9  2  71 
%  23%  46%  10%  6%  13%  3%  100% 
 
Table A3.4 Transactions by strategy and year  
Strategy   1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  Total  % 
S1  2  9  3  1  1  16  23% 
S2  0  8  12  8  5  33  46% 
S3  2  0  2  2  1  7  10% 
S4  1  1  1  1  0  4  6% 
S5  0  3  2  4  0  9  13% 
S6  1  1  0  0  0  2  3% 
Total   6  22  20  16  7  71  100% 
 
Table A3.5 Control group by country 
Country   Total  
Austria   38 
Belgium   22 
Denmark  26 
Finland  3 
France   106 
Germany  126 
Greece  7 
Italy  131 
Netherlands  20 
Portugal  10 
Spain   29 
Sweden   9 
UK   42 
Norway   18 
Total   587  
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ANNEX 4. RESULTS – EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS 
 
a)  Cost and profit efficiency indicators  
Cost efficiency indicators   
 Acquirers Control  group   
Transaction 
type 
 Before 
(1) 
After 
(2)  
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1))  
Before 
(1) 
After 
 (2)  
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1))  
Difference 
(A) - (B)   
Total   63  67.39%  66.61%  -0.78%  36.69%  39.90%  3.21% -3.99% 
National   54  65.89%  66.15%  0.27%  36.72%  39.89%  3.17% -2.90% 
Cross-border   9  78.20%  69.88%  -8.32%  36.60%  39.88%  3.27% -11.59% 
S1  14  78.15%  75.77%  -2.37%  36.92%  39.46%  2.54% -4.92% 
S2  31  58.27%  62.06%  3.79%  36.62%  40.04%  3.42% 0.37% 
S3  5  81.99%  81.77%  -0.22%  36.36%  40.56%  4.20% -4.42% 
S4  4  57.86%  43.51%  -14.36%  37.09%  39.60%  2.51% -16.87% 
S5  8  76.42%  69.37%  -7.04%  36.53%  39.99%  3.46% -10.50% 
S6  1  92.50%  73.93%  -18.57%  37.19%  38.99%  1.79% -20.36% 
 
 
Cost efficiency indicators   
 Targets  Control  group 
Transaction type  Number Before 
(1) 
After 
(2)  
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1))  
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2)  
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1))  
Difference 
(A) - (B)   
Total   65  50.94%  55.72%  4.78%  36.65%  39.94%  3.29% 1.49% 
National   55  51.02%  57.78%  6.76%  36.67%  39.93%  3.25% 3.51% 
Cross-border    10  50.49%  54.99%  4.50%  36.54%  40.00%  3.45% 1.05% 
S1  14  68.88%  69.68%  0.80%  36.92%  39.46%  2.54% -1.74% 
S2  33  41.99%  53.38%  11.39%  36.58%  40.10%  3.52% 7.87% 
S3  4  69.34%  69.33%  -0.01%  36.17%  40.46%  4.29% -4.30% 
S4  4  44.69%  40.85%  -3.84%  37.09%  39.60%  2.51% -6.35% 
S5  9  52.52%  57.28%  4.76%  36.47%  40.11%  3.64% 1.12% 
S6  1  32.20%  34.43%  2.23%  37.19%  38.99%  1.79% 0.44% 66 | RYM AYADI 
 
 
Profit efficiency indicators    
 Acquirers  Control  group 
Transaction 
type 
Number   Before 
(1) 
After 
(2)  
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1))  
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2)  
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
(A) - (B)  
Total   63  33.19%  40.19%  7.00%  10.16%  16.22%  6.06%  0.93% 
National   54  28.94%  39.07%  10.13%  10.19%  16.21%  6.03%  4.10% 
Cross-border    9  55.95%  44.22%  -11.73%  10.12%  16.07%  5.95%  -17.68% 
S1  14  37.95%  44.27%  6.32%  10.67%  15.38%  4.71%  1.61% 
S2  31  27.32%  40.30%  12.98%  10.00%  16.57%  6.57%  6.41% 
S3  5  21.85%  34.19%  12.34%  9.47%  17.57%  8.11%  4.23% 
S4  4  25.06%  23.56%  -1.50%  10.51%  15.12%  4.61%  -6.11% 
S5  8  58.70%  46.92%  -11.77%  9.98%  16.28%  6.30%  -18.07% 
S6  1  34.00%  22.63%  -11.37%  11.28%  14.41%  3.13%  -14.49% 
 
 
Profit efficiency indicators   
 Targets  Control  group  Difference 
(A) - (B) 
 Number    Before 
(1) 
After 
(2)  
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1))  
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2)  
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1))  
 
Total   65  19.75%  30.72%  10.97%  10.10% 16.27%  6.17% 4.80% 
National  55  18.94%  32.47%  13.53%  10.12% 16.27%  6.15% 7.38% 
Cross-
border  
10  24.20%  22.76%  -1.44%  10.01% 16.29%  6.28% -7.72% 
S1  14  26.82%  40.75%  13.94%  10.67% 15.38%  4.71% 9.22% 
S2  33  13.12%  30.60%  17.48%  9.94% 16.67%  6.73% 10.74% 
S3  4  46.23%  30.59%  -15.64%  9.25% 17.18%  7.93% -23.56% 
S4  4  12.13%  20.86%  8.74%  10.51% 15.12%  4.61% 4.13% 
S5  9  26.50%  24.81%  -1.69%  9.87% 16.50%  6.63% -8.32% 
S6  1  3.50%  4.33%  0.83%  11.28% 14.41%  3.13% -2.29% 
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  Cost income ratio (CIR) 
    Acquirers  Control group  
Transactions Number  Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
 (1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   71  63.37% 60.30%  -3.06%  63.96% 66.66%  2.71%  -5.77% 
National   60  64.59% 60.30%  -4.29%  63.95% 66.66%  2.72%  -7.01% 
Cross-border 11  56.72% 60.36%  3.64%  63.99% 66.65%  2.66%  0.98% 
S1 16  64.18% 60.43%  -3.75%  63.96% 65.69%  1.74%  -5.48% 
S2 33  62.81% 58.20%  -4.61%  63.94% 67.12%  3.18%  -7.79% 
S3 7  71.40% 70.18%  -1.22%  63.99% 66.99%  3.00%  -4.22% 
S4 4  68.94% 59.77%  -9.18%  63.93% 66.23%  2.30%  -11.47% 
S5 9  57.28% 61.09%  3.81%  63.99% 67.07%  3.08%  0.72% 
S6 2  54.18% 57.06%  2.88%  64.02% 64.75%  0.74%  2.15% 
   Targets  Control  group 
  Number  Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   69  73.08% 70.05%  -3.02%  63.95% 66.63%  2.67%  -5.70% 
National   59  72.81% 68.30%  -4.51%  63.94% 66.62%  2.68%  -7.19% 
Cross-border 10  74.63% 80.38%  5.75%  64.05% 66.66%  2.62%  3.13% 
S1 16  69.22% 65.06%  -4.17%  63.96% 65.69%  1.74%  -5.90% 
S2 33  78.10% 68.46%  -9.63%  63.94% 67.12%  3.18%  -12.81% 
S3 7  45.53% 65.85%  20.32%  54.77% 57.12%  2.34%  17.98% 
S4 4  73.10% 67.14%  -5.97%  63.93% 66.23%  2.30%  -8.26% 
S5 8  76.07% 82.55%  6.48%  64.05% 67.14%  3.09%  3.39% 
S6 2  68.86% 71.68%  2.82%  64.02% 64.75%  0.74%  2.09% 
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Results- Balance-sheet indicators 
Non-interest costs/Total assets 
 Acquirers  Control  group 
 Number  Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   71  2.24% 2.05%  -0.19%  1.59% 1.59%  0.00%  -0.18% 
National   60  2.16% 2.06%  -0.10%  1.59% 1.59%  0.00%  -0.10% 
Cross-border 11  2.63% 2.00%  -0.62%  1.60% 1.59%  -0.01%   -0.61% 
S1 16  2.01% 1.82%  -0.19%  1.61% 1.56%  -0.05%  -0.14% 
S2 33  2.52% 2.45%  -0.06%  1.58% 1.60%  0.02%  -0.08% 
S3 7  1.10% 0.99%  -0.11%  1.58% 1.60%  0.02%  -0.13% 
S4 4  1.71% 1.62%  -0.09%  1.60% 1.58%  -0.02%  -0.07% 
S5 9  2.39% 2.04%  -0.35%  1.59% 1.60%  0.01%  -0.36% 
S6 2  3.68% 1.82%  -1.85%  1.62% 1.53%  -0.09%  -1.76% 
 Targets  Control  group 
  Number Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
 (1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   71  3.16% 2.71%  -0.45%  1.57% 1.56%  0.00%  -0.45% 
National   60  3.24% 2.87%  -0.37%  1.56% 1.56%  0.00%  -0.37% 
Cross-border 11  2.75% 1.86%  -0.89%  1.60% 1.59%  -0.01%  -0.88% 
S1 16  2.44% 1.68%  -0.75%  1.61% 1.56%  -0.05%  -0.70% 
S2 33  3.29% 3.19%  -0.10%  1.54% 1.55%  0.02%  -0.11% 
S3 7  5.55% 4.14%  -1.41%  1.58% 1.60%  0.02%  -1.43% 
S4 4  1.97% 2.67%  0.70%  1.60% 1.58%  -0.02%  0.72% 
S5 9  2.82% 1.91%  -0.91%  1.59% 1.60%  0.01%  -0.92% 
S6 2  2.45% 1.64%  -0.81%  1.62% 1.53%  -0.09%  -0.72% 
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Interest costs/Total assets 
  Acquirers  Control group  
Transactions Number  Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   71  4.30% 3.22%  -1.08%  3.94% 3.48%  -0.46%  -0.62% 
National   60  4.25% 3.12%  -1.13%  3.94% 3.48%  -0.46%  -0.67% 
Cross-border    11  4.55% 3.75%  -0.80%  3.98% 3.53%  -0.45%  -0.35% 
S1 16  4.35% 3.59%  -0.76%  4.00% 3.54%  -0.46%  -0.30% 
S2 33  4.09% 2.64%  -1.46%  3.90% 3.44%  -0.46%  -1.00% 
S3 7  4.45% 3.56%  -0.89%  3.91% 3.45%  -0.46%  -0.42% 
S4 4  4.88% 4.54%  -0.35%  3.99% 3.54%  -0.45%  0.10% 
S5 9  4.19% 3.23%  -0.95%  3.96% 3.51%  -0.45%  -0.50% 
S6 2  6.18% 6.07%  -0.10%  4.07% 3.61%  -0.46%  0.36% 
 Targets  Control  group 
  Number Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   68  4.68% 3.20%  -1.48%  3.94% 3.48%  -0.46%  -1.02% 
National   59  4.73% 3.24%  -1.49%  3.94% 3.48%  -0.46%  -1.03% 
Cross-border    9  4.39% 2.97%  -1.42%  3.98% 3.53%  -0.45%  -0.97% 
S1 16  5.58% 3.84%  -1.74%  4.00% 3.54%  -0.46%  -1.28% 
S2 33  4.14% 2.57%  -1.57%  3.90% 3.44%  -0.46%  -1.11% 
S3 6  4.99% 4.73%  -0.26%  3.91% 3.45%  -0.46%  0.20% 
S4 4  5.78% 3.81%  -1.97%  3.99% 3.54%  -0.45%  -1.52% 
S5 8  3.91% 2.96%  -0.95%  3.96% 3.51%  -0.45%  -0.50% 
S6 1  6.55% 3.02%  -3.53%  4.07% 3.61%  -0.46%  -3.07% 
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  Acquirers  Control  group 
 Number  Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
 A - B 
Total   71  0.95% 0.99%  0.05%  0.73%  0.69%  -0.04%  0.09% 
National   60  0.95% 1.03%  0.08%  0.73%  0.69%  -0.04%  0.13% 
Cross-border   11  0.95% 0.79%  -0.16%  0.73%  0.70%  -0.03%  -0.13% 
S1 16  0.85% 0.97%  0.13%  0.73%  0.73%  0.00%  0.12% 
S2 33  1.12% 1.16%  0.04%  0.73%  0.67%  -0.06%  0.10% 
S3 7  0.63% 0.72%  0.09%  0.73%  0.67%  -0.07%  0.16% 
S4 4  0.49% 0.77%  0.27%  0.73%  0.71%  -0.02%  0.29% 
S5 9  1.03% 0.83%  -0.20%  0.73%  0.69%  -0.05%  -0.15% 
S6 2  0.57% 0.59%  0.02%  0.72%  0.76%  0.03%  -0.02% 
   Targets  Control  group 
  Number Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   71  0.77% 1.04%  0.27%  0.73%  0.69%  -0.04%  0.31% 
National   60  0.58% 0.91%  0.33%  0.73%  0.69%  -0.04%  0.37% 
Cross-border   11  1.81% 1.73%  -0.08%  0.73%  0.70%  -0.03%  -0.05% 
S1 16  -0.18% 0.86%  1.03%  0.73%  0.73%  0.00%  1.03% 
S2 33  0.77% 1.02%  0.24%  0.73%  0.67%  -0.06%  0.30% 
S3 7  1.52% 0.63%  -0.89%  0.73%  0.67%  -0.07%  -0.82% 
S4 4  0.41% 0.78%  0.37%  0.73%  0.71%  -0.02%  0.39% 
S5 9  2.06% 1.99%  -0.07%  0.73%  0.69%  -0.05%  -0.02% 
S6 2  0.72% 0.58%  -0.14%  0.72%  0.76%  0.03%  -0.17% 
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ROE 
 Acquirers  Control  group      
 Number  Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   71  13.43%  14.14%  0.71%  13.83%  13.34%  -0.27%  0.98% 
National   60  12.53%  13.66%  1.12%  13.84%  13.32%  -0.26%  1.38% 
Cross-border 11  18.33%  16.78%  -1.54%  13.80%  13.47%  -0.33%  -1.22% 
S1 16  10.06%  13.57%  3.51%  13.69%  14.12%  0.43%  3.08% 
S2 33  13.96%  14.25%  0.29%  13.91%  12.98%  -0.93%  1.21% 
S3 7  13.33%  11.49%  -1.84%  13.91%  12.84%  1.22%  -3.06% 
S4 4  9.20%  12.88%  3.69%  13.76%  13.69%  -0.06%  3.75% 
S5 9  18.38%  16.98%  -1.41%  13.85%  13.21%  -0.64%  -0.76% 
S6 2  18.08%  15.91%  -2.16%  13.56%  14.65%  1.09%  -3.25% 
 Targets  Control  group   
  Number Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   71  3.79%  10.30%  6.51%  13.83%  13.34%  -0.27%  6.78% 
National   60  2.85%  10.97%  8.12%  13.84%  13.32%  -0.26%  8.38% 
Cross-border 11  8.92%  6.66%  -2.26%  13.80%  13.47%  -0.33%  -1.93% 
S1 16  1.97%  11.93%  9.96%  13.69%  14.12%  0.43%  9.54% 
S2 33  6.92%  10.94%  4.02%  13.91%  12.98%  -0.93%  4.95% 
S3 7  -14.76%  8.25%  23.01%  13.91%  12.84%  1.22%  21.79% 
S4 4  3.60%  12.12%  8.52%  13.76%  13.69%  -0.06%  8.58% 
S5 9  8.10%  4.64%  -3.45%  13.85%  13.21%  -0.64%  -2.81% 
S6 2  12.65%  15.76%  3.11%  13.56%  14.65%  1.09%  2.02% 
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Interest revenue/Total revenue 
 Acquirers  Control  group 
 Number  Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   71  69.72% 63.79%  -5.93%  83.10% 77.64%  -5.46%  -0.46% 
National   60  69.30% 63.92%  -5.38%  83.06% 77.61%  -5.45%  0.07% 
Cross-border 11  72.00% 63.07%  -8.93%  83.34% 77.79%  -5.55%  -3.38% 
S1 16  73.24% 67.26%  -5.99%  83.65% 78.41%  -5.24%  -0.75% 
S2 33  69.86% 64.18%  -5.68%  82.78% 77.16%  -5.62%  -0.06% 
S3 7  54.99% 54.33%  -0.66%  82.82% 77.62%  -5.20%  4.54% 
S4 4  73.92% 65.25%  -8.67%  83.47% 78.22%  -5.26%  -3.41% 
S5 9  73.13% 62.09%  -11.04%  83.15% 77.38%  -5.77%  -5.27% 
S6 2  66.93% 67.49%  0.56%  84.21% 79.65%  -4.56%  5.12% 
  Targets  Control group    
  Number Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   71  72.25% 65.93%  -6.32%  83.10% 77.64%  -5.46%  -0.85% 
National   60  72.38% 66.63%  -5.75%  83.06% 77.61%  -5.45%  -0.30% 
Cross-border 11  71.54% 62.14%  -9.40%  83.34% 77.79%  -5.55%  -3.85% 
S1 16  73.15% 68.24%  -4.92%  83.65% 78.41%  -5.24%  0.32% 
S2 33  69.69% 65.04%  -4.65%  82.78% 77.16%  -5.62%  0.97% 
S3 7  77.31% 69.75%  -7.57%  82.82% 77.62%  -5.20%  -2.37% 
S4 4  82.84% 67.87%  -14.96%  83.47% 78.22%  -5.26%  -9.71% 
S5 9  75.51% 66.51%  -9.00%  83.15% 77.38%  -5.77%  -3.23% 
S6 2  53.69% 42.48%  -11.21%  84.21% 79.65%  -4.56%  -6.65% 
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Non-interest revenue/Total revenue 
 Acquirers  Control  group 
 Number  Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   71  29.28% 35.00%  5.72% 16.88% 22.34%  5.46%  0.26% 
National   60  29.51% 34.65%  5.13% 16.92% 22.36%  5.44%  -0.31% 
Cross-border 11  28.00% 36.93%  8.93% 16.66% 22.21%  5.55%  3.38% 
S1 16  26.76% 32.74%  5.99% 16.35% 21.59%  5.24%  0.75% 
S2 33  30.14% 35.82%  5.68% 17.19% 22.80%  5.61%  0.07% 
S3 7  34.83% 33.38%  -1.45% 17.18% 22.38%  5.20%  -6.65% 
S4 4  26.08% 34.75%  8.67% 16.53% 21.78%  5.26%  3.41% 
S5 9  26.87% 37.91%  11.04% 16.85% 22.62%  5.77%  5.27% 
S6 2  33.07% 32.51%  -0.56% 15.79% 20.35%  4.56%  -5.12% 
 Targets  Control  group 
  Number Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   71  27.75% 34.07%  6.32% 16.88% 22.34%  5.46%  0.86% 
National   60  27.62% 33.37%  5.75% 16.92% 22.36%  5.44%  0.31% 
Cross-border 11  28.46% 37.86%  9.40% 16.66% 22.21%  5.55%  3.85% 
S1 16  26.85% 31.76%  4.92% 16.35% 21.59%  5.24%  -0.32% 
S2 33  30.31% 34.96%  4.65% 17.19% 22.80%  5.61%  -0.95% 
S3 7  22.69% 30.25%  7.57% 17.18% 22.38%  5.20%  2.37% 
S4 4  17.16% 32.13%  14.96% 16.53% 21.78%  5.26%  9.71% 
S5 9  24.49% 33.49%  9.00% 16.85% 22.62%  5.77%  3.23% 
S6 2  46.31% 57.52%  11.21% 15.79% 20.35%  4.56%  6.65% 
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Total revenue/Total Assets 
 Acquirers  Control  group 
Transactions Number  Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   71  7.37% 6.12%  -1.25%  6.49% 5.89%  -0.60%  -0.65% 
National   60  7.36% 5.95%  -1.41%  6.48% 5.88%  -0.60%  -0.81% 
Cross-border 11  7.43% 7.04%  -0.39%  6.54% 5.94%  -0.60%  0.21% 
S1 16  7.44% 5.92%  -1.51%  6.58% 5.97%  -0.61%  -0.90% 
S2 33  7.51% 5.68%  -1.84%  6.44% 5.84%  -0.59%  -1.24% 
S3 7  6.06% 5.22%  -0.85%  6.45% 5.85%  -0.60%  -0.25% 
S4 4  8.03% 9.60%  1.57%  6.55% 5.96%  -0.59%  2.16% 
S5 9  7.39% 6.94%  -0.45%  6.51% 5.92%  -0.59%  0.13% 
S6 2  7.63% 7.53%  -0.10%  6.67% 6.05%  -0.62%  0.52% 
 Targets  Control  group 
  Number Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   71  8.25% 6.85%  -1.40%  6.49% 5.89%  -0.60%  -0.81% 
National   60  8.40% 7.15%  -1.25%  6.48% 5.88%  -0.60%  -0.65% 
Cross-border 11  7.44% 5.18%  -2.26%  6.54% 5.94%  -0.60%  -1.66% 
S1 16  8.60% 5.91%  -2.69%  6.58% 5.97%  -0.61%  -2.08% 
S2 33  8.32% 7.60%  -0.72%  6.44% 5.84%  -0.59%  -0.12% 
S3 7  8.13% 7.20%  -0.94%  6.45% 5.85%  -0.60%  -0.34% 
S4 4  8.79% 8.40%  -0.40%  6.55% 5.96%  -0.59%  0.20% 
S5 9  6.97% 5.25%  -1.71%  6.51% 5.92%  -0.59%  -1.12% 
S6 2  9.57% 4.85%  -4.72%  6.67% 6.05%  -0.62%  -4.09% 
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Capital Ratio  
   Acquirers  Control  group 
Transactions   Number  Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   71  7.12% 8.46%  1.33%  5.28%  5.18%  -0.11%  1.44% 
National   60  7.47% 9.06%  1.58%  5.28%  5.18%  -0.10%  1.69% 
Cross-border 11  5.22%  5.19% -0.03%  5.29%  5.18% -0.11%  0.08% 
S1 16  6.88% 10.39%  3.51%  5.30% 5.16%  -0.13%  3.64% 
S2 33  8.45% 9.58%  1.13%  5.27%  5.18%  -0.09%  1.22% 
S3 7  5.34%  5.24% -0.10%  5.27%  5.18% -0.09%  0.00% 
S4 4  5.55% 6.12%  0.57%  5.30%  5.18%  -0.12%  0.69% 
S5 9  5.60% 5.61%  0.01%  5.29%  5.19%  -0.10%  0.11% 
S6 2  3.49%  3.26% -0.22%  5.32%  5.16% -0.16% -0.06% 
   Targets  Control  group 
Transactions Number Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   71  9.80%  8.96% -0.84%  5.28%  5.18% -0.11% -0.74% 
National   60  9.07%  8.23% -0.84%  5.28%  5.18% -0.10% -0.73% 
Cross-border 11  13.78%  12.93% -0.85%  5.29%  5.18% -0.11% -0.74% 
S1 16  7.90% 8.78%  0.88%  5.30%  5.16%  -0.13%  1.01% 
S2 33  8.01% 8.74%  0.73%  5.27%  5.18%  -0.09%  0.82% 
S3 7  17.27% 5.44%  -11.84%  5.27%  5.18%  -0.09%  -11.75% 
S4 4  8.10%  6.70% -1.40%  5.30%  5.18% -0.12% -1.28% 
S5 9  15.30%  14.85% -0.45%  5.29%  5.19% -0.10% -0.35% 
S6 2  6.92%  4.25% -2.66%  5.32%  5.16% -0.16% -2.51% 
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Solvency Ratio 
 Acquirers  Control  group 
Transactions Number Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   71  17.71% 13.11%  -4.60%  15.03%  16.57%  1.54%  -6.14% 
National   60  18.55% 12.73%  -5.82%  15.02%  16.58%  1.56%  -7.38% 
Cross-border 11  13.13% 15.19%  2.06%  15.06%  16.49%  1.43%  0.62% 
S1 16  28.53% 16.81%  -11.72%  14.77%  15.63%  0.87%  -12.58% 
S2 33  16.38% 14.88%  -1.50%  15.12%  16.96%  1.84%  -3.34% 
S3 7  12.53% 9.19%  -3.34%  15.13%  17.23%  2.10%  -5.44% 
S4 4  7.09% -15.07%  -22.16% 14.96% 16.12%  1.16%  -23.32% 
S5 9  13.53% 14.80%  1.27%  15.17%  16.80%  1.63%  -0.36% 
S6 2  11.34% 16.94%  5.60%  14.57%  15.12%  0.56%  5.04% 
 Targets  Control  group 
  Number Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(A=(2)-(1)) 
Before 
(1) 
After 
(2) 
Difference 
(B=(2)-(1)) 
Difference 
A - B 
Total   71  22.19% 17.91%  -4.29%  15.03%  16.54%  1.51%  -5.80% 
National   50  22.74% 16.89%  -5.85%  15.01%  16.50%  1.49%  -7.34% 
Cross-border 11  18.63% 24.58%  5.95%  15.13%  16.77%  1.64%  4.31% 
S1 16  36.38% 22.62%  -13.76%  14.77%  15.63%  0.87%  -14.62% 
S2 33  12.54% 13.55%  1.01%  15.12%  16.96%  1.84%  -0.82% 
S3 7  38.26% 18.28%  -19.98%  15.09%  16.55%  1.46%  -21.44% 
S4 4  29.00% 19.35%  -9.65%  14.96%  16.12%  1.16%  -10.81% 
S5 9  17.94% 26.02%  8.08%  15.20%  17.01%  1.81%  6.26% 
S6 2  24.15% 13.11%  -11.03%  14.57%  14.83%  0.27%  -11.30% 
 